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Abstract 
 
Public firms provide a large amount of information through their disclosures. In addition, 
information intermediaries publicly analyze, discuss, and disseminate these disclosures. Thus, 
greater public firm presence in an industry should reduce uncertainty in that industry. Following 
the theoretical prediction of investment under uncertainty, we hypothesize and find that private 
firms are more responsive to their investment opportunities when they operate in industries with 
greater public firm presence. Further, we find that the effect of public firm presence is greater in 
industries with better information quality and in industries characterized by a greater degree of 
investment irreversibility. Our results suggest that public firms generate positive externalities by 
reducing industry uncertainty and facilitating more efficient private firm investment. 
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1. Introduction 
Public firms disclose large amounts of information, such as their business strategy, 
financial performance, expected future outlook, current and future investment outlays, material 
contracts, and business risks. In addition, information intermediaries, such as financial analysts 
and the business press, analyze, discuss, and disseminate firms’ disclosures. Collectively, these 
disclosure activities can improve the information environment for firms within the industry by 
reducing uncertainty about demand, supply, and cost conditions, as these factors are interrelated 
within an industry (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Admati and Pfleiderer, 2000). In contrast, 
private firms are not required to publicly disclose information in the U.S. Also, analysts and the 
business press provide much less coverage of private firms. As a result, little is known about the 
operations and performance of private firms. Thus, the composition of public and private firms in 
an industry is likely to have a significant effect on the industry’s information environment. 
This paper examines whether greater public firm presence in an industry can increase the 
responsiveness of firms’ investment to investment opportunities by enriching the industry’s 
information environment, thereby reducing uncertainty. The intuition is that as more firms in an 
industry publicly disclose information and receive coverage by information intermediaries, a 
more complete perspective of the current economic environment and future outlook for the 
industry emerges. This reduction in industry uncertainty can then be used by peer firms in the 
industry to make more informed investment decisions. Our analysis is based on the theoretical 
predictions of investment under uncertainty, which indicates that when investment decisions are 
(even partially) irreversible, firms become cautious and hold back on investment in the face of 
uncertainty (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). As a result, higher uncertainty leads to a reduction in 
firms’ responsiveness to investment opportunities (Bloom et al., 2007; Julio and Yook, 2012).1 If 
                                                 
  1 Note that our prediction relates to the responsiveness of investment to investment opportunities rather than the 
level of investment. The theoretical literature on investment under uncertainty finds that uncertainty has an 
ambiguous effect on the level of investment. Under some conditions, uncertainty has a positive effect on investment 
(e.g., Hartman, 1972; Abel, 1983; Caballero, 1991), while under other conditions, uncertainty has a negative effect 
(e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Pindyck, 1993). Most empirical studies, however, find a negative relation between 
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greater public firm presence leads to lower uncertainty in the industry, firms operating in that 
industry are likely to be more responsive to investment opportunities. 
Using a novel data set of private U.S. firms created by Sageworks Inc., we investigate 
whether private firms operating in industries with greater public firm presence are more 
responsive to their investment opportunities than those operating in industries with lower public 
firm presence.2 Following Hubbard (1998), we interpret the responsiveness of investment to 
investment opportunities as a proxy for investment efficiency, where investment is measured as 
the change in gross fixed assets (Desai et al., 2009; Asker et al., 2012) and investment 
opportunities is measured using lagged sales growth (Wurgler, 2000; Whited, 2006; Bloom et al., 
2007; Biddle et al., 2009; Asker et al., 2012). We proxy for public firm presence in an industry 
using the percentage of industry sales that are generated by public firms. 
Consistent with our prediction, we find that private firm investment is more sensitive to 
investment opportunities in industries with a greater public firm presence. This result is robust to 
using alternative proxies for investment opportunities (i.e., Tobin’s Q for private firms, industry 
Q, and state tax rate changes), an alternative measure of public firm presence, and controls for 
the degree of competition in an industry. Further, our findings continue to hold when we use 
‘firm fixed-effects’ and a ‘changes’ specification to test our hypothesis.  
Next we examine cross-sectional variation in the relation between public firm presence 
and private firm investment sensitivities. We begin by examining whether differences in the 
quality and quantity of information disclosed in the industry affect the extent to which public 
firm presence reduces uncertainty. If the firms and information intermediaries in an industry 
disclose less information or information that conceals economic performance, public firm 
                                                                                                                                                             
investment and uncertainty (e.g., Leahy and Whited, 1996; Guiso and Parigi, 1999). Bloom et al. (2007) provide 
evidence using simulated data that while the effect of uncertainty on the level of investment depends on modeling 
assumptions, uncertainty reduces the responsiveness of investment to investment opportunities and this relation is 
robust to different assumptions. 
  2 Although our predictions apply for both public and private firms, we focus on private firms to mitigate 
endogeneity concerns and facilitate empirical identification. We provide a detailed discussion in Section 2.2. 
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presence is less likely to reduce uncertainty and facilitate the investment decisions of peer firms 
in such an industry. Accordingly, we predict and find that the relation between public firm 
presence and private firms’ investment sensitivity is stronger when the public firms have more 
informative earnings, provide more management forecasts, and are covered by more analysts. 
Second, we examine whether variation in the degree of investment irreversibility across 
industries affects the relation between public firm presence and private firms’ investment 
sensitivity. Corporate investment decisions are characterized by some degree of irreversibility, 
i.e., investment expenditures are at least partially sunk, and thus cannot be costlessly undone 
once incurred (Pindyck, 1991). When investment decisions are irreversible, uncertainty makes 
firms more cautious and leads firms to take a ‘wait and see’ strategy, thereby reducing the 
sensitivity of investment to investment opportunities (Bloom et al., 2007; Julio and Yook, 2012). 
Accordingly, we predict and find that the effect of public firm presence on the responsiveness of 
investment to investment opportunities is greater in industries characterized by higher degrees of 
investment irreversibility. These cross-sectional results provide additional support for our 
hypothesis that public firms’ disclosures reduce industry uncertainty, which helps peer firms in 
the industry identify and exploit investment opportunities. 
Like other research that examines corporate investment, our empirical tests are subject to 
potential endogeneity concerns. A standard concern in the investment literature is that 
investment opportunities are measured with error (e.g., Erickson and Whited, 2000). Further, 
public firm presence in an industry might be correlated with industry-wide growth opportunities 
that are not captured by our firm-specific proxies for growth opportunities.3 We conduct three 
tests to mitigate these concerns. First, we identify two instruments for public firm presence, 
verify the strength of these instruments (Staiger and Stock, 1997) and their joint validity using an 
overidentification test (Sargan, 1958), and show that our inferences are robust to using both 
                                                 
  3 However, as we note earlier, our predictions concern the sensitivity of investment to investment opportunities 
rather than the level of investment, which is more likely to be affected by changes in growth opportunities. 
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instruments. Second, we conduct our analyses in a setting where private firms are subject to 
similar disclosure requirements as public firms—i.e., the United Kingdom (Ball and Shivakumar, 
2005). Since private firms publicly disclose financial information in the U.K., greater public firm 
presence is unlikely to have an effect on industry uncertainty. Accordingly, we predict that 
public firm presence will not affect investment sensitivities in the U.K. However, if investment 
sensitivities are instead driven by industry growth opportunities or measurement error, we should 
continue to find that public firm presence impacts private firms’ investment sensitivities in the 
U.K. Consistent with our prediction, we find no evidence that public firm presence affects 
investment sensitivities of private firms in the U.K., which further validates our inferences. 
Third, following Asker et al. (2012), we use changes in state corporate income tax rates as an 
exogenous shock to investment opportunities, thereby eliminating the need to measure 
investment opportunities. Again, we find that our inferences are unchanged. 
This paper makes several contributions. First, investment project selection is one of the 
most fundamental and important tasks undertaken by a firm (Hubbard, 1998). Our evidence 
provides insights into the process through which managers obtain industry-relevant information, 
which is central to effective investment decision making. Specifically, we find that the presence 
of public firms in an industry fosters disclosures by not only the public firms themselves, but 
also information intermediaries that analyze, summarize, and disseminate firm news. 
Collectively, these disclosures help to provide a more comprehensive view of the industry, 
thereby reducing uncertainty and facilitating more efficient investment. 
Second, our paper adds to the emerging literature on information transfers and its effect 
on peer firm investment (Durnev and Mangen, 2009; Beatty et al., 2013; Shroff et al., 2013). For 
example, Shroff et al. (2013) show that the external information environment facilitates the 
investment decisions of multinational firms by allowing parent firms to better monitor their 
foreign subsidiaries. Durnev and Mangen (2009) show that accounting restatements are 
associated with lower abnormal returns and reduced investment by non-restating firms in the 
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industry. The authors suggest a ‘learning’ effect in that restatements convey information about 
investment projects to the managers of restating firms’ competitors. However, Gleason et al. 
(2008) argue that restatements cause investors to reassess the content and credibility of financial 
statements issued by other firms in the same industry—i.e., a transparency or ‘accounting 
quality’ effect. Therefore, changes in firms’ investment decisions following restatements by 
competitors could be due to changes in the industry cost of capital. We add to this literature by 
using a broader setting unrelated to restatements to document positive externalities from public 
firm presence. Our setting and the mechanisms we study allow us to further understand the 
information spillovers from public firms. 
Third, although private firms comprise the vast majority of firms in the U.S., little is 
known about private firms’ investment. Asker et al. (2012) compare the investment behavior of 
public and private firms and show that private firm investment is more efficient than that of a 
matched sample of public firms. They attribute the difference in investment efficiency to agency 
issues in public firms. Rather than compare public and private firm investment, this paper 
examines whether differences in investment efficiency within the set of U.S. private firms can be 
partially explained by variation in the presence of public firms in the industry. 
Finally, despite its pervasiveness, disclosure regulation is often quite challenging to 
justify because of market-based incentives to disclose information (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2000; 
Leuz and Wysocki, 2008; Berger, 2011). That is, since the costs of obfuscating information are 
ultimately borne by the firm, the firm has incentives to disclose information to reduce such costs 
(see, e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 2000). One justification put forward in favor of mandatory 
disclosure is the presence of positive externalities to such disclosure. This paper provides initial 
evidence consistent with positive externalities of corporate disclosures, namely, improving the 
average investment efficiency of private firms in the industry.  
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we develop our hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes our sample and variables. Section 4 presents our empirical design and results. 
Section 5 addresses endogeneity. Section 6 presents sensitivity tests. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Motivation 
2.1. Public firms and the information environment 
Mandatory corporate disclosures, such as 10-K and 10-Q filings, contain enormous 
amounts of information about firms and their operating environments (Palepu et al., 2000; Beyer 
et al., 2010). These disclosures are an important source of information about firms’ future sales, 
earnings, supplier/customer contracts, investment outlays, strategic directions, and capital 
structure, which can provide valuable insights into the firms’ prospects. Supporting this 
contention, Li (2010a) shows that forward-looking statements in the Management Discussion 
and Analysis (MD&A) section in 10-Ks contain information about firms’ future earnings. 
Lundholm et al. (2010) show that store growth rate information in retail firms’ 10-Ks can be 
used to generate reasonably accurate sales forecasts. Most recently, Li et al. (2013) find that 10-
K disclosures of firms’ competitive environment are related to the firms’ future profitability. 
These studies suggest that the information disclosed by public firms in regulatory filings is 
informative about firms’ future performance and to some extent, the overall industry outlook. 
In addition to providing important information in mandatory financial reports, public 
firms often voluntarily disclose valuable information to the market. For example, firms often 
disclose value-relevant information about future prospects, such as earnings and cash flows 
forecasts (Beyer et al., 2010; Goodman et al., 2013) as well as important corporate actions or 
events, such as product launches (Gu and Li, 2003), capital expenditures (Li, 2010b; Brown et 
al., 2006), and management turnovers (Weisbach, 1995; Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993). 
Bonsall et al. (2013) provide evidence that management forecasts of firms with greater exposure 
to macroeconomic risks contain significant and timely information about the macro-economy. 
These studies suggest that firms’ voluntary disclosures, especially earnings and capital 
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expenditure forecasts, are likely to be informative about the economic environment of the 
industry. 
Besides firm-initiated disclosures, information intermediaries, such as financial analysts 
and the business press, analyze, summarize, and disseminate information about individual public 
firms as well as the overall industry and macro-economy (e.g., Asquith et al., 2005; Frankel et 
al., 2006). Recently, Hutton et al. (2012) show that analyst earnings forecasts are more accurate 
than management forecasts when the firms’ earnings move in concert with macroeconomic 
factors, suggesting that analyst forecasts contain valuable information about the macro-economy. 
Similarly, Kadan et al. (2012) find that analysts often issue industry-level recommendations, 
which are associated with the future performance of the industries. These studies indicate that 
analyst reports contain important and relevant information about future industry prospects. 
In contrast to public firms, private firms are generally not required to disclose 
information to the public. Further, the lack of demand for information about private firms by 
shareholders and potential investors reduces the likelihood that private firms receive analyst 
coverage. As a result, much less is known about the operations and performance of private firms. 
In fact, as Farre-Mensa (2011) suggests, one of the primary reasons firms stay private is to avoid 
having to disclose proprietary information to competitors and potential entrants.4  
Given the significant differences between public and private firms with respect to public 
information generation, the composition of public and private firms in an industry is likely to 
have a significant effect on the information environment of the industry as a whole. That is, to 
the extent a more comprehensive set of firms in an industry publicly disclose information and are 
                                                 
  4 When asked about the public information provided by Groupon in its pre-initial public offering (IPO) filings, Tim 
O’Shaughnessy (chief executive officer (CEO) of LivingSocial) indicated, “When…there’s some opacity in how 
people are operating, you make guesses, and some of those guesses are right and some of them are wrong. I’m a 
data-oriented guy, and fundamentally it’s interesting to see, OK, what do your numbers actually look like? What do 
your growth rates actually look like? …you’re actually able to match up and see how good were our guesses… One 
of the things that—and many people have talked about this—is just that they [Groupon] have become much more 
increasingly international and I think that went from a very small piece of their business to the majority of their 
business in a very short period of time. A lot of people have said, boy, that’s interesting.” (The Wall Street Journal, 
August 29, 2011). 
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covered by information intermediaries, a more complete view of the current economic 
environment and future outlook for the industry emerges. Consequently, we predict that private 
firms operating in industries with greater public firm presence can better identify and exploit 
investment opportunities, thereby increasing their responsiveness to investment opportunities. 
Our prediction is based on the theoretical analyses of investment under uncertainty where 
corporate investments are viewed as ‘options’ and are characterized by some degree of 
irreversibility (McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Pindyck, 1991; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). This 
literature suggests that firms face a trade-off between (1) postponing investment to wait for 
additional information, which lowers the risk of an ex post suboptimal decision, but increases the 
risk of potentially missing a valuable opportunity, and (2) investing now, which lowers the risk 
of missing a profitable opportunity, but increases the chance of making an ex post suboptimal 
decision. The primary result from this literature is that capital investments have option value and 
the value of waiting for additional information before investing/disinvesting (i.e., not exercising 
the option) is greater when there is greater uncertainty. 
An alternative view initiated by Hartman (1972) and followed by Abel (1983) argues that 
greater uncertainty increases the investment of a risk-neutral firm in a competitive environment. 
They show that given constant returns to scale, the marginal product of capital is a convex 
function of the uncertain price faced by the firm, so that by Jensen’s inequality, greater 
uncertainty raises the marginal value of one additional unit of capital, leading to higher 
investment. Caballero (1991) and Abel and Eberly (1994, 1996) generalize this result. 
While the theoretical literature finds that the relation between uncertainty and investment 
is ambiguous, most empirical studies find a negative relation between uncertainty and investment 
(see, e.g., Leahy and Whited, 1996; Guiso and Parigi, 1999). More relevant to our paper, Bloom 
et al. (2007) show that uncertainty reduces the responsiveness of investment to investment 
opportunities. They also show (using simulated data) that while the effect of uncertainty on 
investment levels is sensitive to the different modeling assumption [such as in Hartman (1972) 
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and Abel (1983)], its effect on the responsiveness of investment to investment opportunities is 
robust to a variety of assumptions about adjustment costs, convex marginal product of capital, 
and time-varying uncertainty (see Bloom et al., 2007, Table 3, pp. 401–402). Our prediction 
builds on the analyses in Bloom et al. (2007). Specifically, we predict that reduced industry 
uncertainty (through greater public firm presence) increases peer firms’ investment sensitivities. 
In the Appendix, we develop a two-period model that shows that uncertainty reduces the 
sensitivity of investment to investment opportunities, but has an ambiguous effect on the level of 
investment. 
 
2.2. Private firm setting 
Although our logic for the impact of public firm presence readily extends to the 
investment behavior of both public and private firms, we focus on the investment behavior of 
private firms for three reasons. First, using a private firm setting allows us to better isolate the 
mechanism through which public firm externalities manifest. As Bushman and Smith (2001) 
argue, financial information can affect firms’ investment decisions by (1) helping firms identify 
and exploit investment opportunities (i.e., reducing uncertainty), and (2) reducing agency issues 
through enhanced monitoring, which can lead to improved managerial behavior as well as 
reductions in the firm’s cost of capital due to lower information asymmetry. Since agency issues 
are arguably much less prevalent among private firms,5 the role of accounting information in 
disciplining managers and reducing information asymmetry due to better disclosure (i.e., channel 
2) are less likely.6 
                                                 
  5 For example, Ang et al. (2000, p. 83) observe that “[w]hen compared to publicly traded firms, [private firms] 
come closest to the type of [zero-agency-cost] firms depicted in the stylized theoretical model of agency costs 
developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976).” 
  6 While it is conceivable that an increase in public firm presence reduces industry uncertainty for both private firms 
and their creditors, public firm presence is unlikely to reduce information asymmetry between the two parties 
because the information disclosed by public firms doesn’t directly concern the private firms’ borrowing capacity. 
Rather, public firm disclosures are relevant for private firms’ creditors only to the extent these disclosures provide 
information that reduces industry uncertainty. However, creditors have much more information about the industry 
than an individual private firm because creditors lend money to many firms, and hence obtain detailed information 
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Second, examining the externalities of public firm presence on the investment decisions 
of other public firms can introduce an endogeneity bias because public firm presence in an 
industry is likely to increase when private firms have initial public offerings (IPOs). To the 
extent private firms choose to have their IPOs and become public when they are rapidly growing, 
our results might be affected by such unobservable increases in firm growth, which is correlated 
with public firm presence. By focusing on private firms, we effectively remove firms that choose 
to have IPOs from our sample, thus reducing the likelihood of such an endogeneity bias. 
Lastly, we focus on private firms because they are an economically important group of 
firms, and little is known about their investment behavior (Asker et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2011). 
Asker et al. (2012) estimate that in 2007, private U.S. firms accounted for 54.5% of aggregate 
nonresidential fixed investment, 67.1% of private sector employment, 57.6% of sales, and 20.6% 
of aggregate pre-tax profits. Further, they document that private firms accounted for 85.6% of all 
firms with 500 or more employees and more than 98% of all firms in 2007. Despite their 
importance in the U.S. economy, little is known about their investment decisions. 
Regardless of the above arguments for focusing on private firms, we recognize that our 
prediction is valid for public firms as well. Therefore, we examine whether our results hold for 
public firms in Section 6.3. 
 
3. Data and variable measurement 
3.1. Sample selection 
We obtain confidential access to private firm data from Sageworks Inc., a company that 
collects private firm data from a large number of accounting firms and develops financial 
analysis tools, primarily for accounting firms and banks. Sageworks cooperates with most of the 
largest national accounting firms as well as many of the regional firms. Like Compustat, 
                                                                                                                                                             
from all firms they have relationships with. More importantly, while the cost of debt and supply of funds has a direct 
relation with the level of investment, its effect on the sensitivity of investment to investment opportunities is unclear.  
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Sageworks contains data from income statements and balance sheets along with basic 
demographic information, such as the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) 
industry codes and geographic location, except that Sageworks exclusively covers private firms. 
Although firms are anonymous, each firm in the Sageworks database has a unique identifier 
allowing us to construct a panel. The main drawback of anonymity for our purpose is that we 
cannot identify a closer group of peer firms that produce public financial statements. 
Sageworks started in 2000 with fiscal year 2001 as the first panel year. We have data 
through fiscal year 2010 giving us a ten-year panel data set. To construct our sample of private 
companies, we follow Minnis (2011) and exclude all observations with data quality issues as 
well as non-U.S. based companies. Specifically, we delete all firm-years that fail to satisfy basic 
accounting identities as well as those with net income (NI), cash flow from operations (CFO), 
accruals (ACC), or property, plant, and equipment (PPE) that are greater than total assets at year-
end. We also require firm-years to have assets and sales greater than $100,000 (Minnis, 2011). 
We remove financial firms (NAICS 52) and regulated utilities (NAICS 22) because typical 
investment models are not suited for financial firms and the investment decisions of utilities are 
often regulated. Finally, we drop firm-year observations with missing values for gross fixed 
assets, total assets, sales, and net income. Applying the above sampling restrictions results in a 
sample of 70,235 firm-years (34,064 firms). 
 
3.2. Variable measurement 
3.2.1. Investment and investment opportunities 
Most prior research on investment focuses on capital expenditures (CapEx), mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A), and/or research and development (R&D) expenditure. However, 
Sageworks’ data do not allow us to distinguish between these forms of investment. Therefore, we 
measure investment as annual increases in fixed assets (Asker et al., 2012). Specifically, we 
follow Asker et al. (2012) and measure investment as gross investment (INV), which is the 
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annual increase in gross fixed assets scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. We also 
use net investment as an alternative proxy for investment, where net investment is the annual 
increase in net fixed assets scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year. While CapEx and 
M&A lead to an increase in fixed assets (i.e., INV), R&D does not affect fixed assets, and hence 
is not captured by INV. We acknowledge this data limitation and provide evidence suggesting 
that our inferences are unlikely to be driven by it. Specifically, we find that our inferences are 
unaffected when we drop industries with the highest R&D intensity as observed for public firms. 
A large empirical investment literature uses either Tobin’s Q or sales growth as a proxy 
for investment opportunities. Tobin’s Q is usually constructed as the ratio of the market value of 
firms’ total assets to its book value. However, since private firms are not traded on a stock 
exchange, their market value is not observed. We therefore favor sales growth (SALES_GR) as 
our proxy for investment opportunities. Sales growth is widely used as a measure of investment 
opportunities in prior research on investment (see, e.g., Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; Shin and Stulz, 
1998; Whited, 2006; Whited and Wu, 2006; Bloom et al., 2007; Asker et al., 2012). 
For robustness purposes, we use two additional measures of investment opportunities. 
First, following Campello and Graham (2013) and Asker et al. (2012), we construct a measure of 
Tobin’s Q for private firms. Campello and Graham (2013) suggest regressing Tobin’s Q for 
public firms on four variables thought to be informative about a firm’s marginal product of 
capital. The four variables include: sales growth, return on assets (ROA), net income, and 
leverage. The resulting regression coefficients are then used to generate a ‘predicted Q’ 
(TOBIN’S_Q) for each private firm in our sample. Second, we use industry Q (INDUSTRY_Q) as 
a proxy for the investment opportunities available to each firm in the industry. INDUSTRY_Q is 
measured as the size-weighted average Q of all public firms in each four-digit NAICS industry. 
A standard concern in the investment literature is that investment opportunities are 
measured with error (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Almeida et al., 2010; Erickson and Whited, 
2000, 2012). To address this concern, we use an approach that circumvents the need to directly 
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measure investment opportunities. Following Asker et al. (2012), we use a change in state 
corporate income tax rates as an exogenous shock to firms’ investment opportunities. Tax 
changes directly affect the after-tax cash flows from investments, thereby providing a relatively 
clean measure of changes in investment opportunities. While changes in the federal tax rates are 
rare, there is considerable variation in state taxes across time. We obtain data for 21 tax cuts and 
15 tax increases over our sample period in a total of 20 states from the Tax Foundation, which 
we verify using state legislature and state department of revenue Web sites (following Asker et 
al. 2012). We code a firm as being affected by a tax change if the firm is headquartered in a state 
that changed tax rates.7 We code tax changes using an indicator variable set to 1 (-1) for firms 
affected by a tax decrease (tax increase), and zero otherwise (TAX_CHANGE).8 We also separate 
tax changes into tax increases (TAX_INCREASE) and tax decreases (TAX_DECREASE) to 
examine whether they differentially affect investment. 
 
3.2.2. Public firm presence 
To capture the presence of public firms in an industry, we obtain data on the total number 
of firms operating in each four-digit NAICS industry from the Census Bureau, and we proxy for 
the total number of public firms in the industry using Compustat. We use two measures of public 
firm presence in an industry: (1) total sales by public firms scaled by total sales by all firms in 
the industry (PUBLIC_PROP_S), and (2) the number of public firms scaled by the total number 
of firms in the industry (PUBLIC_PROP_F). The first measure can be thought of as a value-
                                                 
  7 A drawback of using state tax changes is that states levy taxes on all corporate activities within their jurisdiction, 
irrespective of where a firm is headquartered. Therefore, if a firm operates in multiple states, their firm-level 
investment decisions will be less sensitive to a tax change in the headquartered state. To mitigate the concern that 
state tax rate changes do not affect firms’ taxes and hence, their decisions, in untabulated analyses we verify that our 
tax change proxies are significantly correlated with changes in firms’ effective tax rates. 
  8 We use an indicator variable instead of changes in tax rates because some of the tax changes (e.g., the 
introduction of a state Alternative Minimum Tax or a tax surcharge) affect a firm’s overall tax burden, but not 
marginal tax rates. 
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weighted proportion of public to total firms in an industry, whereas the second measure is an 
equal-weighted proportion. 
During our sample period, the Census Bureau data are only available in 2002 and 2007.  
To obtain the total number of firms (industry sales) for years other than 2002 and 2007, we 
calculate the growth in the number of firms (industry sales) between 2002 and 2007 and apply 
that rate to the base year of 2002. This allows us to approximate the number of firms and 
industry sales for all years in our sample period. In untabulated results, we verify the robustness 
of our inferences to using data from years 2002 and 2007 only. We also find that our inferences 
are unchanged when we proxy for industry sales and number of firms using Sageworks and 
Compustat data in place of Census data. 
 
4. Research design and empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1, Panel A presents summary statistics for our variables of interest. Our primary 
proxy for investment is the change in gross fixed assets (INV), which is 4.2% of total assets 
during our sample period. Average sales growth (SALES_GR) is 14%, average predicted Tobin’s 
Q (TOBIN’S_Q) is 1.32, and the average industry Q (INDUSTRY_Q) is 1.39. These values are 
similar to those reported in Asker et al. (2012). Table 1, Panel A also shows that the private firms 
in our sample are fairly profitable with an average ROA of 13.5%, have large cash balances 
(CASH) equal to 14.1% of total assets, and finance 53% of their assets by debt (LEVERAGE). 
The reliance on leverage is not surprising given that private firms have little access to equity 
markets (Berger and Udell, 1998). Also, the average firm in our sample has $6 million in assets. 
Finally, we find that the proportion of public firms’ sales to total industry sales is 28.1% and the 
ratio of public firms to all firms in the industry is 0.4%. 
Table 1, Panel B reports the Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the diagonal 
for our main variables of interest. Consistent with our expectations, we see strong positive 
correlations between investment (INV), investment opportunities (SALES_GR; TOBIN’S Q; 
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INDUSTRY Q), and past performance (ROA). We also find that both our proxies for public firm 
presence are positively correlated. Specifically, the Pearson (Spearman) correlation between 
PUBLIC_PROP_S and PUBLIC_PROP_F is 0.37 (0.72). 
Table 1, Panel C (and Fig. 1) shows cross-sectional (time-series) variation in public firm 
presence, PUBLIC_PROP_S. Our data reveal that there is significant variation in public firm 
presence both across industries and over time, but perhaps not surprisingly, cross-sectional 
variation appears to be greater than the time-series variation. In the cross-section, we find that 
the mining, information, and manufacturing industries have the highest public firm presence and 
the wholesale trade, other services, and agriculture industries have the lowest public firm 
presence. In the time-series, we find that the average public firm presence across all industries 
fluctuates over time with its peak in 2001 at 32% and its lowest value in 2005 at 26%. 
 
4.2. Baseline regressions: Public firm presence and investment sensitivities 
Our main prediction is that private firms operating in industries with a greater public firm 
presence are more responsive to their investment opportunities than those operating in industries 
with lesser public firm presence. We estimate the following regression to test our prediction: 
INVi,t = β1 SALES_GRi,t-1 + β2 PUBLIC_PROPj,t-1 + β3 SALES_GRi,t-1 x PUBLIC_PROPj,t-1 + 
 β4 HIj,t + β5 HIj,t x SALES_GRi,t-1 + β6 ROAi,t-1 + β7 CASHi,t-1 + β8 LEVERAGEi,t-1 +                (1) 
 β9 ASSETSi,t-1 + εi,t,         
 
where INVi,t is the change in gross fixed assets scaled by total assets for firm i in year t, 
SALES_GRi,t-1 is the percentage change in sales for firm i in year t-1,  PUBLIC_PROPj,t-1 is the ratio 
of public firms’ sales to total industry sales or the ratio of the number of public firms to total 
firms in industry j and year t-1, HIj,t-1 is a Herfindahl index for competition, measured as the 
square of firm sales scaled by aggregate industry sales summed over all firms in the industry. We 
use both private and public firms’ data to compute aggregate industry sales, thereby reducing 
measurement error in HI (see Ali et al., 2009). ROAi,t-1 is net income scaled by beginning-of-year 
assets for firm i in year t-1, LEVERAGEi,t-1 is the beginning-of-year long-term and short-term debt 
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scaled by assets for firm i in year t-1, and ASSETSi,t-1 is the total assets for firm i in year t-1. We 
include indicator variables for each year and four-digit NAICS industry to capture systematic 
changes in investment across years and industries. We cluster standard errors at the firm-level to 
allow for residual correlation in firms’ investment over time. 
The coefficient of interest in the above equation is β3, which captures the incremental 
sensitivity of investment to investment opportunities related to the proportion of public firms in 
an industry. We control for HI and HI x SALES_GR to allow for the possibility that industry 
competition affects firms’ investment efficiency. The remaining control variables are based on 
Asker et al. (2012). Specifically, we control for CASH and LEVERAGE because firms with 
greater cash holdings or lower leverage might more easily take advantage of improvements in 
investment opportunities. Finally, we control for ROA and ASSETS because profitable firms and 
large firms have fewer financing constraints.9 
The results from this regression are presented in Table 2, Panel A. The table shows that 
the coefficient for SALES_GR x PUBLIC_PROP_S is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level, indicating private firm investment is more responsive to investment opportunities in 
industries with a larger proportion of public firms.10 In economic terms, we find that a 1% 
increase in the proportion of public firms increases investment sensitivities by 0.65% from the 
                                                 
9 A potential concern induced by controlling for variables such as ROA and ASSETS is that they are likely to be 
correlated with growth opportunities. Since our interest lies in the estimating the sensitivity of investment to growth 
opportunities, these control variables may affect the interpretation of our results. In untabulated analyses, we verify 
that our inferences are unchanged when we remove these controls.  
10 While sales growth is widely used as a measure of investment opportunities in prior research, it is most applicable 
for production technologies for which the profitability of current and future projects are highly correlated (e.g., the 
neoclassical model). However, when the profitability of new projects is different than the profitability of existing 
projects [e.g., production technologies, such as putty-clay; see Gilchrist and Williams (2000) and Gomes et al. 
(2003)], sales growth is harder to interpret. In untabulated analyses, we verify that our results hold for the subsample 
of industries that show high persistence in profitability (i.e., the profitability of new projects is similar to that of 
existing projects). This analysis helps mitigate concerns that the results are driven by industries that have production 
technologies such as putty-clay, where measurement error from using sales growth to proxy for investment 
opportunities is likely to be high. 
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mean level.11 Table 2, Panel A also shows that this result is robust to using the alternative 
measure of public firm presence, PUBLIC_PROP_F. In Table 2, Panels B and C, we re-estimate 
our results using two alternative measures of investment opportunities based on the predicted 
Tobin’s Q (TOBIN’S_Q) from Campello and Graham (2013) and industry Q (INDUSTRY_Q). 
We find that our inferences remain unchanged using these alternative proxies.  
Finally, in Table 2, Panel D, we re-estimate our results using changes in state tax rates to 
proxy for changes in investment opportunities. A decrease (increase) in a state’s corporate 
income tax rate increases (decreases) project net present values (NPV) for firms operating in that 
state, which should increase (decrease) firms’ after-tax returns on investment, and thus their 
investment opportunities. This test provides insight into whether private firms are more sensitive 
to changes in state corporate income tax rates when they operate in industries with a greater 
public firm presence. To conduct this test, we augment Eq. (1) by including two additional 
covariates: TAX_CHANGE and PUBLIC_PROP x TAX_CHANGE. Since changes in investment 
opportunities due to tax changes are unlikely to be captured by SALES_GR, we continue to 
include SALES_GR and SALES_GR x PUBLIC_PROP in the regression (Asker et al., 2012). 
Table 2, Panel D shows that the coefficient for TAX_CHANGE is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level, indicating that private firms’ investment is responsive to changes in 
state tax rates. Further, the coefficient for PUBLIC_PROP_S x TAX_CHANGE is also positive 
and statistically significant at the 5% level. This result suggests that the investment of private 
firms operating in industries with greater public firm presence is more responsive to state tax rate 
changes than that of private firms operating in industries with lower public firm presence. 
We recognize, however, that tax rate changes could reflect political economy factors, 
such as firms lobbying the state legislature, which could be endogenous to firms’ investment 
opportunities. To address this concern, we construct two indicator variables to capture a tax rate 
                                                 
11 The average responsiveness of investment to investment opportunities is 0.0197 (i.e., 0.0161 + 0.0127 x 0.281) 
and the incremental effect of a 1% change in public firm presence is 0.0127 x 1%.  
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increase, TAX_INCREASE, and decrease, TAX_DECREASE. While it is possible that tax cuts are 
in part due to firms’ lobbying efforts, it is less clear why firms would lobby for a tax increase. 
Table 2, Panel D shows that TAX_INCREASE (TAX_DECREASE) is negatively (positively) 
associated with INV, which is consistent with expectations. Further, the change in investment 
spending following tax rate decreases (tax rate increases) is more positive (negative) when the 
industry is comprised of a greater proportion of public firms. This result supports our hypothesis 
and mitigates the concern that our inferences are driven by the potential endogeneity between tax 
rate changes and firms’ investment opportunity sets. 
Finally, in another validation of our tax rate-change identification strategy, we re-
estimate our results for private firms that are not incorporated under Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) Subchapter C (C-Corps). Given that only C-Corps are subject to state corporate income 
taxes, tax rate changes should have little effect on the investment behavior of private non-C-
Corps. Table 2, Panel D confirms this prediction. Specifically, we find that the coefficients for 
TAX_CHANGE and PUBLIC_PROP_S x TAX_CHANGE are statistically insignificant. In 
untabulated results, we also find that the coefficient for PUBLIC_PROP_S x TAX_CHANGE is 
statistically different for C-Corps and non C-Corps (p-value = 0.09). 
Aside from our main variable of interest, we find that the coefficients for our control 
variables are consistent with prior research and our expectations. Specifically, we find that ROA 
and CASH are positively related to investment, and LEVERAGE and ASSETS are negatively 
related to investment. Finally, we note that the coefficient for PUBLIC_PROP is generally 
positive and significant, suggesting that firms operating in industries with higher public firm 
presence invest more. To the extent higher public firm presence reduces uncertainty, this result is 
consistent with Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012) who find that when managers own a large 
fraction of the firm (such as in private firms), managerial risk aversion induces a negative 
relation between uncertainty and investment. 
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For the remainder of the analyses, we report results using PUBLIC_PROP_S as our 
measure of public firm presence and SALES_GR as our proxy for investment opportunities for 
the sake of brevity. However, we obtain similar results when we use PUBLIC_PROP_F, 
TOBIN’S_Q, INDUSTRY_Q, and TAX_CHANGE instead. 
 
4.3. Cross-sectional tests 
4.3.1. Industry information quality and quantity 
The information environment in the industry is determined not only by a greater public 
firm presence, but also by the quality and quantity of information disclosed by these public 
firms. While the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) mandatory disclosure 
requirements provide a basic framework and minimum standard for many financial disclosures, 
considerable latitude remains in determining what information is actually provided. For example, 
Kothari (2001) surveys a large body of accounting research that finds there is significant cross-
sectional variation in the information content of earnings. Beyer et al. (2010) and Healy and 
Palepu (2001) survey research on voluntary disclosure and discuss the time-series and cross-
sectional patterns in the number of firms providing management guidance of future performance. 
In addition to variation in the quality and quantity of disclosures provided by firms, there are 
differences in the amount of information provided by information intermediaries (see Asquith et 
al., 2005). 
Differences in information quality and quantity affect the extent to which public firm 
presence reduces uncertainty. Therefore, we predict that the relation between public firm 
presence and private firms’ investment sensitivity is stronger in industries with better public firm 
information. We estimate the following regression to test our prediction: 
INVi,t = β1 SALES_GRi,t-1 + β2 PUBLIC_PRORj,t-1 + β3 SALES_GRi,t-1 x PUBLIC_PROPj,t-1 +  
β4 INFO_QTYj,t-1 + β5 SALES_GRi,t-1 x INFO_QTYj,t-1 + β6 PUBLIC_PROPj,t-1 x                    (2) 
INFO_QTYj,t-1 + β7 SALES_GRi,t-1 x PUBLIC_PROPj,t-1 x INFO_QTYj,t-1 + 
 CONTROLS + εi,t, 
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where INFO_QTYj,t-1 is our proxy for the information quality in industry j and year t-1. 
CONTROLS is a vector of control variables that includes CASH, LEVERAGE, ROA, and 
ASSETS, defined previously. The coefficients of interest are β3 and β7, where the former captures 
the effect of public firm presence on the responsiveness of private firm investment to their 
investment opportunities and the latter captures the incremental effect of public firm presence on 
private firms’ investment responsiveness as information quality in the industry changes. 
We use three proxies to capture information quality in an industry. Our first proxy is 
earnings informativeness. Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) and Kothari (2001) discuss a simple 
model of the effect of noise in a signal on the price reaction to the signal. Their basic result is 
that noise in a signal reduces the price reaction to the signal. For example, noise in earnings 
reduces the earnings response coefficient (ERC)—our measure of earnings informativeness. 
Following this intuition, we use ERCs as a proxy for information quality. We measure ERCs as 
the association between annual stock returns and changes in annual earnings (Hanlon et al. 
2008). We measure annual stock returns as the raw buy-and-hold 12-month return beginning the 
fourth month after the fiscal year-end of t-1 and ending three months after the fiscal year-end of 
year t, and we measure changes in earnings as the change in earnings before extraordinary items 
from year t-1 to year t, scaled by the market value of equity at the end of year t-1 (see Hanlon et 
al., 2008). Our proxy for earnings informativeness is the average ERC for all public firms in an 
industry-year (ERC). 
A number of firms provide investors with guidance about their expectations of future 
earnings, capital expenditures, revenues, etc. Prior research finds that the forward-looking nature 
of such disclosures can (individually and in aggregate) help reduce uncertainty about the future 
prospects of the industry and macro-economy (Anilowski et al., 2007; Bonsall et al., 2013). 
Therefore, we use the total number of firms providing at least one management forecast in each 
industry-year as our second proxy for industry information quality. 
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Our final proxy for industry information quality is the average number of financial 
analysts covering firms in an industry-year. Prior research finds that financial analysts play a 
significant role in analyzing firms’ disclosures and providing additional insights about the firm 
and the industry (Asquith et al., 2005; Hutton et al., 2012; Kadan et al., 2012). For example, 
Kadan et al. (2012) find that sell-side analysts provide detailed reports about each industry and 
that analyst industry rankings are significantly associated with the future industry performance.  
 Table 3 presents the results from estimating Eq. (2). The table shows that the coefficient 
for SALES_GR x PUBLIC_PROP_S continues to be positive and statistically significant at the 
5% level or better in all three regressions. Consistent with our earlier inference, these results 
indicate that public firm presence is positively associated with the responsiveness of investment 
to investment opportunities for private firms in that industry. Further, we find that the coefficient 
for SALES_GR x PUBLIC_PROP_S x INFO_QTY is also positive and statistically significant at 
the 5% level or better for all three measures of industry information quality. These coefficients 
indicate that public firm presence has a greater effect on the investment responsiveness of private 
firms when public firm earnings are more informative, when a larger number of public firms 
provide guidance, and when there are more analysts covering the firms in the industry. In other 
words, the externality generated from public firm presence is greater when public firms are 
associated with better quality disclosures.12 
 
4.3.2. Degree of investment irreversibility  
Thus far, we argue and provide evidence that public firm presence reduces industry 
uncertainty, which leads to an increase in the sensitivity of investment to investment 
opportunities. The intuition is that corporate investment decisions are characterized by some 
                                                 
  12 In untabulated analyses, we use the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act as an exogenous shock to 
public firm disclosure quality. However, since we have limited data for private firms in the years prior to SOX, we 
examine the effect of public firm presence on the investment behavior of public firms. Consistent with our 
expectations, we find that public firm presence has a greater effect on investment sensitivities following the 
enactment of SOX. 
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degree of irreversibility; that is, investment expenditures are at least partially sunk, and thus 
cannot be costlessly undone. When investment decisions are even partially irreversible, 
uncertainty makes firms more cautious and leads firms to take a ‘wait and see’ strategy, which 
reduces the sensitivity of investment to investment opportunities (Bloom et al., 2007). 
In this section, we examine whether cross-sectional differences in the degree of 
investment irreversibility in an industry affects the public firm presence externality. In particular, 
when there is a greater degree of investment irreversibility in an industry, we predict that public 
firm presence has a larger effect on investment sensitivities. In other words, if firms can more 
easily liquidate installed capital (i.e., sunk costs are lower), firms should be relatively less likely 
to take a ‘wait and see’ strategy when facing uncertainty. 
We use three proxies for industry investment irreversibility. Our first proxy is industry 
“comovement” following Guiso and Parigi (1999) and Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012). This 
proxy relies on the intuition in Shleifer and Vishny (1992) that an asset’s liquidity, defined as the 
difference between its selling price and its value in best use, depends on the performance of other 
firms in the same industry. If the firms that are likely to be the next-best users of the assets for 
sale (i.e., other firms in the industry) are also experiencing problems and liquidity constraints, 
then it will be difficult for the selling firm to find a buyer that will pay a price close to the value 
in best use, and thus, the seller will likely have to resort to outsiders (i.e., firms in a different 
industry). Outsiders incur reconversion costs and agency costs, since as outsiders they are likely 
to know less than insiders about the quality of the assets. Consequently, an outsider will only buy 
at a considerably lower price than an insider would be willing to pay if only he were not 
liquidity-constrained (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Guiso and Parigi, 1999; Panousi and 
Papanikolaou, 2012). This reasoning suggests that asset illiquidity (i.e., investment 
irreversibility) is likely to plague industries that suffer common shocks more severely than 
industries where idiosyncratic shocks are more important. Following Guiso and Parigi (1999), 
we measure the investment irreversibility of a firm using the return comovement in its industry. 
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Comovement is computed by regressing the monthly returns for each public firm on an equally 
weighted market return index and an equally weighted industry return index (Parrino, 1997).13 
The partial correlation coefficient for the industry return index is averaged across all firms in 
each industry to obtain the first proxy for the investment irreversibility in an industry. Higher 
comovement suggests higher investment irreversibility in the industry. 
Our second proxy for industry irreversibility follows from Schlingemann et al. (2002), 
who use the volume of mergers and acquisition (M&A) transactions in an industry as a measure 
of the liquidity of corporate assets in the industry. As Schlingemann et al. (2002) discuss, the 
intuition for this proxy also follows from Shleifer and Vishny (1992), who argue that a high 
volume of M&A transactions in an industry is evidence of high liquidity and that the discounts 
that sellers must offer to attract buyers are smaller in more active markets. When the market for 
corporate assets is more liquid, firms’ investment decisions are less irreversible. We compute 
this proxy by aggregating all M&A transactions in an industry each year from the Securities Data 
Company (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database and scaling it by the aggregate book value 
of equity of all firms in that industry (see Schlingemann et al., 2002). We multiply this measure 
by minus one to obtain our second proxy for asset illiquidity, or investment irreversibility. 
Finally, we follow Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012) and use the industry-level ratio of 
expenditure on new capital goods to all (i.e., new plus used) capital goods. The intuition for this 
proxy is that when a greater fraction of the capital goods purchased by firms come from the 
primary market as opposed to the secondary market, investment decisions are more irreversible. 
Our data to construct this proxy come from the Annual Capital Expenditures Survey (ACES) 
published by the Census Bureau in their 2003 survey, and we use three-digit NAICS codes for 
industry groupings. 
                                                 
  13 A firm’s stock price reflects the present value of its future residual cash flows. As a result, if the firms in an 
industry are affected by common shocks, such as changes in economic conditions or technological innovations, their 
cash flows, and therefore their stock prices, are likely to move together.  
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Table 4 presents the results from our regressions. Consistent with the earlier evidence, we 
find that the coefficient for SALES_GR x PUBLIC_PROP_S is positive and significant indicating 
that an increase in public firm presence leads to an increase in the responsiveness of investment 
to investment opportunities. Further, we find that the coefficient for SALES_GR x 
PUBLIC_PROP_S x IND_IRR is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level (or better) 
for all three measures of investment irreversibility.14 These coefficients indicate that public firm 
presence has a larger effect on the investment sensitivities of private firms when the industry has 
a higher degree of investment irreversibility. Collectively, these cross-sectional tests help 
strengthen support for our overall inference that public firm presence facilitates private firms’ 
investment responsiveness by reducing uncertainty in the industry. 
 
5. Endogeneity 
We find that private firm investment is more responsive to investment opportunities in 
industries with greater public firm presence. Our intuition is that the information available in the 
public domain due to the presence of public firms helps reduce uncertainty in the industry, which 
allows private firms to respond more quickly to their investment opportunities because they are 
more confident about the future payoffs from their investments (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Bloom 
et al., 2007). However, it is plausible that public firm presence is correlated with industry-wide 
growth opportunities, as changes in public firm presence may indicate changes in firms’ interest 
in accessing equity capital to fund growth. Thus, greater public firm presence may be associated 
with greater investment opportunities and hence greater investment. 
It is important to note, however, that our empirical predictions relate to the sensitivity of 
investment to investment opportunities rather than the level of investment. An increase in growth 
                                                 
  14 In untabulated analyses, we verify the robustness of our results to using two additional measures of 
irreversibility: 1) the average ratio of sales of property, plant, and equipment to total capital at the industry level, as 
it is easier to disinvest in industries in which the used capital market is active, and 2) the depreciation rate of capital 
at the industry level, since investment is less irreversible when capital depreciates faster. These proxies are used and 
described in Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012). 
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opportunities is likely to explain an increase in the level of investment, but its relation with the 
sensitivity of investment to investment opportunities is less clear. Moreover, we include the main 
effect of public firm presence in our regressions to capture its direct effect on the level of 
investment. That said, it is possible that public firm presence and our investment opportunities 
measure are both noisy proxies for industry-wide growth opportunities. Thus, the incremental 
responsiveness of investment to investment opportunities in industries with greater public firm 
presence documented in our tests may be a result of increased precision obtained from 
interacting two imperfect proxies for industry-wide growth opportunities. We address this 
endogeneity concern with the following tests. 
 
5.1. Instrumental variable approach 
 First, we estimate a two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) regression and instrument for public 
firm presence using two variables: 1) an estimate of the incremental audit fees induced by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and 2) the location of firms in the industry. Prior research 
finds that SOX significantly increased the cost being public and served as a catalyst for firms to 
go private or deregister their common stock, thereby suspending their obligation to comply with 
SEC reporting requirements (Foley and Lardner, 2007; Leuz et al., 2008). Among other costs, 
the internal control requirements in Section 404 of SOX are cited as especially costly as it 
significantly increased the audit fees paid by public firms (Financial Executives International 
(FEI), 2005; Iliev, 2010).15 Based on this observation, we argue that increases in audit fees due to 
SOX are likely to affect the proportion of firms that are public but these audit fee changes do not 
directly affect industry growth opportunities, thus meeting the requirements for a valid 
instrument (Wooldridge, 2002).  
                                                 
15 In fact, President Obama unveiled the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act in January 2011, which 
recognizes the significant costs imposed by SOX on firms wanting to go public. The Act is designed to postpone the 
additional costs of compliance that originated with SOX for “emerging growth companies” and encourage these 
firms to go public. 
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To identify variation in audit fees that can be attributed to SOX, we estimate a regression 
of audit fees on the determinants of audits fees as documented in prior research (e.g., 
Venkataraman et al., 2008; Badertscher et al., 2013). Specifically, we regress log audit fees on 
firm size, growth, the number of business segments, big-four vs. other auditor, leverage, 
abnormal accruals, the fraction of assets in inventories and receivables, and indicator variables 
for foreign operations, losses, operating in a litigious industry, and the presence of an internal 
control weakness. This regression is estimated using all firms available in Audit Analytics for the 
years 2001 to 2010. The residual from this regression (RAUDIT_FEES) is aggregated by industry 
and year, and it proxies for the audit fees incurred due to SOX. Fig. 2 plots RAUDIT_FEES over 
time. Consistent with audit fees increasing due to SOX, the figure shows that RAUDIT_FEES 
significantly increases in 2003 and 2004, but remains relatively constant after that. 
Our second instrument is based on the location of firms in the industry. A number of 
prior studies find that investors are biased towards investing in nearby companies (Coval and 
Moskowitz, 1999, 2001; Malloy, 2005; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005; Bae et al., 2008).16 As a 
result of this investor preference for nearby firms, the ability of a firm to issue equity and its cost 
of equity depends on the distance between the firm and potential investors (Loughran, 2008; 
Saunders and Steffen, 2011). Specifically, Loughran (2008) finds that firms headquartered near a 
large population of potential investors find it easier and less costly to issue equity. Therefore, the 
distance between firms in an industry and potential investors is likely to affect the proportion of 
public firms in that industry. However, the distance between firms and potential investors should 
not directly affect investment opportunities in the industry.  
                                                 
  16 One explanation for this bias is that proximity to companies provides investors with an information advantage. 
For example, Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) find that retail investors earn 3.2% more per year on local stocks than 
on their other investments. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that local stocks that are held by mutual funds earn 
annual returns that are about 3% higher on average than other local stocks that are not held by mutual funds, 
indicating that mutual funds are able to pick out the winners among the local firms. 
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Based on the above line of reasoning, we construct our second instrument for public firm 
presence as the proportion of the firms in the industry headquartered near potential investors. 
Following Loughran (2008), we classify firms headquartered in a state with a major metropolitan 
area (i.e., an area with 1,000,000 people or more), as identified in the 2000 Census, as being near 
a large population of potential investors.17 We also classify firms headquartered in states without 
metropolitan areas, but whose state border is less than 150 miles from a metro area in a 
neighboring state, as being near a large population of potential investors. Following prior 
research, the location of a firm’s headquarters is used to approximate the firm’s location (e.g., 
Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2001; Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005; Loughran, 2008). After 
classifying all firms (both public and private) as ‘nearby’ or ‘faraway’ from potential investors, 
we construct our instrument as the proportion of firms in an industry located near investors 
weighted by firm sales. Our identifying assumption is that industries with a greater proportion of 
firms near investors are likely to have greater public firm presence, but the distance from 
investors is uncorrelated with growth opportunities in the industry.18 
 The results from our 2SLS regressions are reported in Table 5. In Panel A, we report the 
results from the first-stage regressions, where the dependent variables are the two endogenous 
variables, i.e., PUBLIC_PROP_S and SALES_GR x PUBLIC_PROP_S. We argue that audit fees 
increase the cost of being public and proximity to investors reduces the cost of being public. 
                                                 
  17 Loughran (2008) identifies the city where each firm is headquartered and classifies firms as nearby or faraway 
from investors based on the city. However, since we do not have access to cities where private firms are 
headquartered, our classification is based on the state where a firm is headquartered. 
  18 It is plausible that firms in large metropolitan areas are likely to be closer to potential investors and are also 
likely to have access to a larger pool of potential customers. Therefore, such firms not only have access to cheaper 
equity financing but also may have greater growth opportunities, leading to a correlation between firm location and 
growth opportunities. To address this concern, we examine the association between firm location and our growth 
opportunity proxies, i.e., Tobin’s Q and sales growth. We find little evidence that firm location is related to its 
growth opportunities. One reason why we might not observe an association between growth opportunities and firm 
location is that if urban areas have more growth opportunities (e.g., more potential customers) than rural areas, then 
new firms are more likely to set up their businesses in urban areas. As more firms set up their businesses in urban 
locations, these additional growth opportunities are likely to be competed away until new firms are indifferent 
between locating at an urban or rural area. Therefore, in equilibrium, we might not observe an association between 
firm location and growth opportunities. 
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Consistent with these arguments, we find that RAUDIT_FEES (SALES_GR x RAUDIT_FEES) is 
negatively related to public firm presence (public firm presence interacted with sales growth) and 
DISTANCE (SALES_GR x DISTANCE) is positively related to public firm presence (public firm 
presence interacted with sales growth). 
Table 5, Panel B presents the results from the second-stage regressions. The first two 
models report regressions where the instruments are used one at a time such that the model is 
exactly identified and Model 3 presents the results from our overidentified model, where both 
instruments simultaneously are included in the regression. Consistent with the results 
documented in earlier tables, we find that the coefficient for SALES_GR x PUBLIC_PROP_S is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, irrespective of the instrument used for public 
firm presence. Staiger and Stock (1997) propose a test for the strength of an instrument under the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients for the instruments in the first stage are zero. The diagnostic 
section of Table 5, Panel B shows that we can reject this hypothesis at any confidence level, and 
both our instruments clearly pass the threshold for this F-test (F-statistics = 26.70 and 20.96), 
thereby mitigating concerns of a weak instrument bias. The partial F-statistic from the first-stage 
regression in the overidentified model (Model 3) is also statistically significant at the 1% level 
(F-statistic = 29.93). Further, the overidentified model allows us to test for overidentifying 
restrictions using a J-test (Sargan, 1958). Consistent with our instruments being jointly valid, we 
find that the J-statistic is statistically insignificant (p-value = 0.21). 
 
5.2. Falsification test: Public firm presence and private firm investment in the U.K. 
Our hypothesis is that private firms operating in industries with greater public firm 
presence find it easier to identify and exploit investment opportunities because greater public 
firm presence is indicative of a more comprehensive set of firms publicly disclosing information. 
In the United Kingdom, however, private firms are also required to publicly disclose their 
financial statements (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Therefore, in the U.K., the proportion of 
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public firms does not capture the proportion of firms publicly disclosing information, and thus is 
less likely to capture variation in the information environment of the industry as a whole. To the 
extent greater public firm presence does not help reduce industry uncertainty in the U.K., our 
prediction is that public firm presence will not be associated with greater investment sensitivities 
in the U.K. However, if public firm presence is a proxy for industry growth opportunities, we 
would find that private firm investment is more sensitive to investment opportunities in 
industries with greater public firm presence even in the U.K. 
To test this prediction, we obtain data on both private and public firms in the U.K. from 
the Amadeus database supplied by Bureau van Dijk. Amadeus provides financial statement data 
for a vast set of European companies and is compiled from several well-established national 
information collectors (Burgstahler et al., 2006). We use all public and private firms with non-
missing data on sales and industry codes in the U.K. to compute the proportion of public to total 
firms in the industry, which is identical to our proxy using U.S. firms. We then estimate our main 
analysis (which uses U.S. data) on the sample of U.K. private firms. 
The results from this test are reported in Table 6. In the first column, we estimate a 
regression of private firm investment (INV) on our proxy for investment opportunities 
(SALES_GR) to validate our proxies in the U.K. setting.19 In the next column, we include 
additional covariates for PUBLIC_PROP_S and SALES_GR x PUBLIC_PROP_S, and in the 
final column, we include all control variables used in our earlier analyses. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, we find that the coefficient for SALES_GR x PUBLIC_PROP_S is statistically 
insignificant in both the simple model without controls (t-stat = -0.21) and the full model with all 
control variables included (t-stat = -0.04). Finally, note that the coefficients for all the other 
variables in the model are consistent with our expectations and those reported in the earlier 
tables. Given the above results, any alternative explanation would not only have to explain why 
                                                 
  19 Note that we use the same variable definitions in both the U.K. and U.S. settings. 
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we find evidence that public firm presence affects investment sensitivities in the U.S., but would 
also have to explain why we find no such evidence in the U.K. This result helps further reduce 
concerns that our results are driven by an omitted variable bias. 
 
6. Additional analyses and robustness tests 
6.1. Firm fixed-effects and change analysis 
We re-examine our results using both a firm fixed-effects and a changes specification to 
mitigate concerns that an unobserved time-invariant characteristic confounds our results. In the 
firm fixed-effects specification, we include an indicator variable for all but one unique firm in 
our sample. For the changes specification, we compute the change in investment, investment 
opportunities, and our control variables from the years 2004 to 2007 and re-estimate our 
regressions. We choose 2004 because this is the earliest year that Sageworks has a large sample 
of firms, and we use 2007 because we have current Census data on aggregate industry sales for 
2007. Since we use the change in our variables of interest over a single period rather than using 
annual changes, our sample size drops to 3,647 observations, where each observation represents 
a unique firm. 
Panel A (B) of Table 7 presents the results for the fixed-effects (changes) specification. 
Panel A indicates the coefficient for the interaction between investment opportunities and public 
firm presence is positive and significant (5% level) across all three investment opportunities 
proxies. Panel B shows that the coefficient for the interaction between the change in investment 
opportunities and the change in public firm presence is positive and statistically significant at the 
5% level when investment opportunities are measured using sales growth and Tobin’s Q (t-stat = 
2.03 and 2.17, respectively) and is significant at the 10% level when we use industry Q as our 
proxy for investment opportunities (t-stat = 1.63). These results indicate that a change in public 
firm presence is positively associated with the change in the responsiveness of investment to 
investment opportunities.  
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6.2. Public firm presence and financing constraints 
It is plausible that public firm presence reduces creditors’ (rather than private firms’) 
uncertainty about industry prospects, which provides private firms easier access to credit. That is, 
it is plausible private firms are fairly certain about industry prospects and would like to invest but 
are unable to take advantage of potential investment opportunities because of financing 
constraints. In such a scenario, an increase in public firm presence might reduce creditors’ 
uncertainty about the industry and make them more willing to supply credit, thereby relaxing 
private firms’ financing constraints. 
To examine this possibility, we test whether an increase in public firm presence leads to 
an increase in the amount of debt used by private firms. To the extent private firms’ financial 
constraints have been relaxed as a result of increased public firm presence, we should observe an 
increase in the amount of debt held by private firms.20 Note that the financing constraints 
argument is one-sided and only applies to an increase in debt, and thus an increase in investment. 
In contrast, if public firm presence helps mitigate industry uncertainty for private firms (as we 
suggest), there is no clear reason to expect changes in debt financing. The information obtained 
by private firms may be just as likely to discourage investment as it is to encourage investment. 
Moreover, firms that are not financially constrained may use internal funds rather than external 
funds to finance investment. Accordingly, we examine whether an increase in public firm 
presence is associated with an increase in private firms’ debt. We focus on changes in debt 
financing because prior research finds that bank financing is the primary source of external 
capital for privately held firms in the U.S. (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1998). 
Table 8 presents the results from a regression of the change in long-term debt on the 
change in public firm presence from 2004 to 2007. We find the coefficient for the change in 
                                                 
  20 While it is possible that banks and private firms simultaneously learn information that reduces uncertainty for 
both parties, to the extent this happens, our inferences remain unchanged. That is, we only contend that private firms 
learn information that makes them more responsive to their investment opportunities. We do not make any statement 
about whether other parties besides the firm also learn information from public firm disclosures. 
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public firm presence is statistically insignificant suggesting that an increase in public firm 
presence is not associated with a change in private firm debt. This result suggests that public firm 
presence does not incrementally affect financing constraints by reducing uncertainty for 
creditors. This is perhaps because creditors, unlike individual private firms, are able to obtain 
large amounts of information about the industry from both public and private firms in the 
industry through loan documentation since they lend to and obtain loan applications from a 
number of firms in the industry. Therefore, an increase in public firm presence might not provide 
any incremental information that significantly impacts creditor uncertainty. 
 
6.3. Public firm presence and public firm investment 
As noted earlier, our prediction that public firm presence reduces industry uncertainty, 
and thus increases the responsiveness of investment to investment opportunities, readily extends 
to both private and public firms. However, thus far we focus our analyses on private firms to 
facilitate empirical identification. In this section, we examine whether public firms are also more 
responsive to their investment opportunities when there is greater public firm presence. 
Specifically, we re-estimate Eq. (1) for all public firms in the Compustat database with available 
data to construct our variables of interest.  
Table 9 presents the results. We find that the coefficient for the interaction between 
investment opportunities and public firm presence is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level for all four measures of investment opportunities, i.e., sales growth, Tobin’s Q, industry 
Q, and state tax changes. These results support our hypothesis that greater public firm presence 
in an industry facilitates the investment decisions of firms operating in that industry.  
 
6.4. Untabulated sensitivity tests 
A limitation of our empirical design is that we are able to obtain aggregate industry sales 
from the Census for only two years, 2002 and 2007, and therefore extrapolate/interpolate 
aggregate industry sales for the other years in our sample. In untabulated analyses, we examine 
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whether our results are robust to computing aggregate industry sales using the sum of sales of all 
firms in the Sageworks and Compustat databases. That is, instead of using Census data to obtain 
aggregate sales, we assume that the firms covered in Sageworks and Compustat are 
representative of the population of firms in the industry. We find that our inferences are 
unaffected by the alternative design. In untabulated analyses, we also restrict our sample period 
to include only the years for which we have Census data, i.e., 2002 and 2007. Here again, we 
find that all our results are similar, but statistically weaker than those reported in the paper. 
Finally, we use the ranks and decile ranks of PUBLIC_PROP_S as alternative measures of public 
firm presence to allow the relation between public firm presence and private firms’ investment 
sensitivity to be nonlinear, and our results are robust to both of these measures. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Publicly owned firms disclose both mandatory and voluntary information to the public. 
Further, information intermediaries, such as analysts and the business press, analyze, summarize, 
and disseminate firm disclosures. As a result, there is a tremendous amount of public information 
about these firms that is not available for private firms. Therefore, the composition of public and 
private firms in an industry may affect the information environment in that industry. 
In this paper, we examine whether the presence of public firms in an industry facilitates 
the investment decisions of private firms in that industry by reducing uncertainty in the industry. 
We find that public firm presence has a significant effect on the responsiveness of private firms’ 
investment to their investment opportunities. Further, we find that this effect is greater in 
industries with better information quality and those with greater investment irreversibility. These 
inferences are robust to alternative explanations related to measurement error in our proxy for 
investment opportunities and a growth opportunity-based interpretation of public firm presence. 
This paper contributes to the literature by providing insights into the process through 
which managers obtain industry-relevant information, which facilitates their investment 
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decisions. Our analysis suggests that public firms’ disclosures help to provide a more 
comprehensive view of the industry, thereby facilitating more efficient investment. Further, by 
showing that public firms’ disclosures can have positive externalities, we contribute to the 
literature on the merits of mandatory disclosure regulation. Disclosure regulation is often quite 
challenging to justify because of market-based incentives to disclose information (Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 2000; Leuz and Wysocki, 2008; Berger, 2011). Since the costs of obfuscating 
information are ultimately borne by the firm, the firm has incentives to disclose information to 
reduce such costs until the marginal net benefit of disclosure to the firm is zero. However, the 
presence of positive externalities to firms’ disclosures is one potential justification for disclosure 
regulation.
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Appendix. Two-period model of the effect of uncertainty on investment and investment 
sensitivity 
 
We clarify our predictions concerning the effect of public firm presence on the 
responsiveness of investment to investment opportunities using a two-period model. The model 
is set up based on Pindyck (1993), Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chapter 2), and Grenadier and 
Malenko (2010) and is as follows: 
The existing demand state is ଴ܲ and capital stock is ܭ଴. At date 1, there is a demand shock 
and ଵܲ increases to ଴ܲ ൅ ∆. The demand shock can be permanent or temporary. If the shock is 
permanent, demand at period 2 stays constant, i.e., ଶܲ ൌ ଴ܲ ൅ ∆	and if the shock is temporary, 
demand reverts back and ଶܲ ൌ ଴ܲ. The shock is temporary with probability 0.5 and permanent 
with probability 0.5. The firm needs to decide how much to invest (i.e., expand capacity) in 
response to the demand shock. 
 
The firm can buy any amount of capital ܫ௧. The return on capital stock per-period is ௧ܲ ൈ ܭ௧ఈ, 
where ߙ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ to obtain decreasing returns to scale. Capital stock at period 1 is: ܭଵ ൌ ܭ଴ ൅ ܫଵ 
and at period 2 is: ܭଶ ൌ ܭ଴ ൅ ܫଵ ൅ ܫଶ. For simplicity, we set ܭ଴ ൌ 0 and ଴ܲ ൌ 0. Investment is 
irreversible, and hence cannot be undone without significant cost. The cost of capital (or discount 
rate) is constant and set equal to one for simplicity. 
 
At the beginning of period 2, the firm observes the realization of ଶܲ, (i.e., whether ଶܲ ൌ ଴ܲ ൅∆ or ଶܲ ൌ ଴ܲ) and decides on additional investment, ܫଶ. 
 
We consider two regimes. In the first regime, there is no uncertainty and the firm knows 
whether the shock is permanent or temporary. In the second regime, the firm is uncertain about 
whether the shock is temporary or permanent. We assume that uncertainty about the demand 
shock can be diversified away, and hence, it does not affect the cost of capital.21 
 
Regime 1: Investment without uncertainty (or high public firm presence) 
 
In this regime, the firm knows if the demand shock is permanent or temporary. Because there 
is no news at period 2, ܫଶ ൌ 0. At period 1, the firm solves the following problem to determine ܫଵ 
if the shock is permanent: 
 
݉ܽݔூభ 	ሼ2 ൈ ∆ ൈ ܫଵ
ఈ െ ܫଵሽ. 
 
Hence,  
ܫଵ ൌ ܫଵு ൌ ሺ2 ൈ ߙ ൈ ∆ሻ భభషഀ. 
                                                 
  21 It is plausible that uncertainty affects the cost of capital and affects investment levels via the cost of capital. Our 
assumption that uncertainty is diversifiable follows from a long line of research on real options (e.g., Pindyck, 1991; 
Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Bloom et al., 2007; Grenadier and Malenko, 2010). Further, Leahy and Whited (1996) 
provide some empirical validation for this assumption by showing that uncertainty affects investment directly (i.e., 
due to real options) rather than working through the cost of capital. 
 36 
 
If the shock is temporary, the firm solves the following problem to determine ܫଵ: 
 
݉ܽݔூభ 	ሼ∆ ൈ ܫଵ
ఈ െ ܫଵሽ. 
 
Hence,  
ܫଵ ൌ ܫଵ௅ ൌ ሺߙ ൈ ∆ሻ భభషഀ. 
 
Regime 2: Investment under uncertainty (or low public firm presence) 
 
In this regime, the firm is uncertain whether the demand shock is permanent or temporary. 
We begin by solving the firm’s investment problem in period 2, assuming that the firm invests ܫଵ 
in period 1. 
 
In period 2, the firm observes whether the demand shock is permanent or temporary. If the 
demand shock is temporary, then ଶܲ reverts back to zero and ܫଶ ൌ 0. If the demand shock is 
permanent, then ଶܲ	stays at the same level (i.e., ଶܲ ൌ ଵܲ ൌ ଴ܲ ൅ ∆) and the firm solves the 
following problem: 
 
݉ܽݔூమ 	ሼ∆ ൈ ሺܫଵ ൅ ܫଶሻ
ఈ െ ܫଶሽ. 
 
Hence,  
 
ߙ ൈ ∆ ൈ ሺܫଵ ൅ ܫଶሻఈିଵ ൌ 1 
 
ܫଶ ൌ ܫଶு|ܫଵ ൌ ݉ܽݔ ቄሺߙ ൈ ∆ሻ భభషഀ 	െ ܫଵ, 0ቅ. 
 
Consider the investment problem in period 1. The optimal choice of investment satisfies: 
 
݉ܽݔூభ 	ሼ∆ ൈ ܫଵ
ఈ െ ܫଵ ൅ 0.5 ൈ ሺ∆ ൈ ሾܫଵ ൅ ܫଶு|ܫଵሿఈ െ ܫଶு|ܫଵሻሽ. 
 
It can be verified that the following equation solves the investment problem: 
 
ܫଵ ൌ ሺߙ ൈ ∆ሻ భభషഀ. 
 
Intuitively, if  ܫଵ ൌ ሺߙ ൈ ∆ሻ భభషഀ, then ܫଶ ൌ 0 (see above). However, ܫଵ ൌ ሺߙ ൈ ∆ሻ భభషഀ also 
maximizes the static payoff at period 1. 
 
Implications for the responsiveness of investment to investment opportunities 
 
Uncertainty: The sensitivity of period 1 investment to the demand shock is  
 
߲ܫଵ
߲∆ ൌ
1
1 െ ߙ ൈ ߙ
భ
భషഀ ൈ ∆ ഀభషഀ≡ ܵ௨. 
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No uncertainty: The sensitivity of period 1 investment to the demand shock if the shock is 
temporary is  
 
߲ܫଵ
߲∆ ൌ
1
1 െ ߙ ൈ ߙ
భ
భషഀ ൈ ∆ ഀభషഀ	ൌ ܵ௨. 
 
The sensitivity of period 1 investment to the demand shock if the shock is permanent is  
 
߲ܫଵ
߲∆ ൌ
1
1 െ ߙ ൈ ሺ2 ൈ ߙሻ
భ
భషഀ ൈ ∆ ഀభషഀ	൐ ܵ௨. 
 
On average, the sensitivity of investment to the demand shock absent uncertainty is 
 
1
2 ൈ ൬൤
1
1 െ ߙ ൈ ߙ
భ
భషഀ ൈ ∆ ഀభషഀ൨ ൅ ൤ 11 െ ߙ ൈ ሺ2 ൈ ߙሻ
భ
భషഀ ൈ ∆ ഀభషഀ൨	൰ ൐ ܵ௨. 
 
Therefore, investment is less responsive to the demand shock (i.e., investment opportunities) 
when there is uncertainty. 
 
Implications for the level of investment 
 
Although the above model suggests that, on average, investment will be lower in the 
presence of uncertainty, note the intuition from the model can be applied to a firm’s 
disinvestment decision as well. Specifically, instead of a demand shock, it is plausible that the 
firm experiences a cost shock and is deciding on whether to reduce capacity by disinvesting. In 
the case of disinvestment decisions, uncertainty would increase the firm’s incentive to postpone 
disinvestment (i.e., take a ‘wait and see’ strategy), which would empirically show up as higher 
investment levels. Specifically, if some firms in an economy are investing in response to a 
demand shock while some other firms are disinvesting in response to a cost shock, we might 
observe that, on average, uncertainty is unrelated to investment (where investment is measured 
as investment less disinvestment, which corresponds to the variable used in our empirical 
analyses [i.e., changes in fixed assets]). 
 
Second, the effect of uncertainty on investment levels depends on whether we assume 
increasing or decreasing returns to scale. However, the sensitivity of investment to investment 
opportunities is lower in the presence of uncertainty irrespective of whether there is increasing or 
decreasing returns to scale. 
 
Finally, note that while the simple two-period model described above suggests that 
investment levels will be lower in the presence of uncertainty, it is unclear whether this result 
will hold if the model is extended to three or more periods. Specifically, if the above model were 
extended to three or more periods, the incentives to invest in the second period following the 
realization of the shock can increase average investment levels in the presence of uncertainty. 
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Fig. 1. Empirical distribution of public firm presence from 2001 to 2010. This figure presents the mean, 25th 
percentile, median, mean, and 75th percentile of public firm presence for the years 2001 to 2010. We measure public 
firm presence as the sum of all public firm sales (per Compustat) in each four-digit NAICS industry divided by total 
firm sales (per Census) in the same four-digit NAICS industry. The x axis represents years and the y axis represents 
public firm presence. 
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Fig. 2. The residual audit fees from 2001 to 2010. This figure presents the average residual audit fees after 
factoring out firm characteristics such as size, accruals, profitability, auditor, and firm complexity, among other 
things. The x axis represents the year and the y axis represents log residual audit fees. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics for variables of interest 
 
  Panel A presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in our main regressions. Panel B reports the Pearson 
(Spearman) correlation coefficients above (below) the diagonal for the variables used in our main regressions. The 
bold coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% level or better. Panel C presents the proportion of public firms 
(i.e., PUBLIC_PROP_S, which is defined below) in each two-digit NAICS industry. INV equals the change in gross 
fixed assets from year t-1 to t, divided by beginning-of- year total assets. SALES_GR is the percentage change in 
sales from year t-1 to year t. TOBIN’S_Q is computed following Campello and Graham (2013): within each three-
digit NAICS industry, we first regress each public firm’s Tobin’s Q on the firm’s sales growth, ROA, net income 
before extraordinary items, book leverage, and year. We then use the regression coefficients to generate TOBIN’S_Q 
for each private firm. INDUSTRY_Q is the sum of aggregate market value of equity and aggregate book value of 
debt in an industry divided by aggregate total assets in that industry. ROA equals net income divided by beginning-
of-year total assets. CASH is cash and cash equivalents divided by beginning-of-year assets. LEVERAGE is debt in 
current liabilities plus long-term debt divided by beginning-of-year assets. ASSETS is the natural log of total assets. 
PUBLIC_PROP_S is the sum of all public firm sales (per Compustat) in a four-digit NAICS industry, divided by the 
total firm sales (per Census) in the same four-digit NAICS industry. PUBLIC_PROP_F is the number of all 
Compustat firms (Compustat GVKEY) in a four-digit NAICS industry, divided by the total number of firms in the 
same four-digit NAICS industry (Census data). All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics  
 
Mean Std Q1 Median Q3 N
Investment spending
INV 0.042 0.078 0.000 0.016 0.061 70,235
Investment opportunities
SALES_GR 0.140 0.339 -0.044 0.070 0.233 70,235
TOBIN'S_Q 1.320 0.838 0.604 1.197 2.092 70,235
INDUSTRY_Q 1.392 1.402 0.929 1.256 1.632 70,235
Firm characteristics
ROA 0.135 0.191 0.008 0.075 0.209 70,235
CASH 0.141 0.146 0.025 0.085 0.215 70,235
LEVERAGE 0.530 0.253 0.332 0.552 0.735 70,235
ASSETS 0.942 1.416 -0.031 0.928 1.864 70,235
PUBLIC_PROP_S 0.281 0.319 0.048 0.113 0.418 70,235
PUBLIC_PROP_F 0.004 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.001 70,235
Private firm characteristics
Public firm presence
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Univariate correlations among our variables of interest 
    
 
Panel C: Public firm presence in each two-digit NAICS industry (based on sales) 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 INV  0.09 0.04 0.02 0.16 -0.02 0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.02
2 SALES_GR 0.13  0.18 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.02
3 TOBIN'S_Q 0.05 0.15  0.12 0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.01 0.33 0.15
4 INDUSTRY_Q 0.06 0.06 0.26 0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.04
5 ROA 0.17 0.13 0.05 0.12  0.21 -0.17 -0.22 0.00 0.02
6 CASH -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.20  -0.37 -0.22 -0.04 -0.01
7 LEVERAGE 0.00 0.08 -0.08 -0.04 -0.16 -0.37  0.18 -0.06 -0.03
8 ASSETS -0.03 0.12 -0.01 -0.10 -0.15 -0.24 0.19  0.09 0.08
9 PUBLIC_PROP_S 0.02 -0.01 0.32 0.14 -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.10  0.37
10 PUBLIC_PROP_F 0.03 0.03 0.29 0.10 -0.03 -0.11 -0.03 0.23 0.72  
Industry description NAICS code Proportion of 
public firms
N
Mining, quarrying, and oil and gas extraction 21 0.786 501
Information 51 0.750 978
Manufacturing 31-33 0.564 15,378
Real estate and rental and leasing 53 0.382 1,298
Retail trade 44-45 0.347 11,493
Accommodation and food services 72 0.294 1,867
Transportation and warehousing 48-49 0.290 1,088
Professional, scientific, and technical services 54 0.208 1,708
Educational services 61 0.117 270
Arts, entertainment, and recreation 71 0.114 640
Health care and social assistance 62 0.112 1,127
Construction 23 0.107 21,069
Wholesale trade 42 0.092 11,095
Other services 81 0.078 1,718
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 11 0.003 5
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Table 2 
Investment regressions conditional on public firm presence 
 
  Panel A (B, C, D) in this table reports the results from regressions of changes in gross fixed assets on 
past sales growth (lagged Tobin’s Q, lagged industry Q, changes in state corporate income tax), the 
proportion of public firms in an industry, an interaction between the two, and control variables. INV 
equals the change in gross fixed assets from year t-1 to year t, divided by beginning-of-year total assets. 
SALES_GR is the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t. TOBIN’S_Q is computed following 
Campello and Graham (2013): within each three-digit NAICS industry, we first regress each public firm’s 
Tobin’s Q on the firm’s sales growth, ROA, net income before extraordinary items, book leverage, and 
year. We then use the regression coefficients to generate TOBIN’S_Q for each private firm. 
INDUSTRY_Q is the sum of aggregate market value of equity and aggregate book value of debt in an 
industry, divided by aggregate total assets in that industry. HI is the Herfindahl index for competition, 
measured as the square of firm sales scaled by the sum of all firms (both private and public) in the same 
four-digit NAICS industry. ROA is net income, divided by beginning-of-year total assets. CASH is cash 
and cash equivalents, divided by beginning-of-year assets. LEVERAGE is debt in current liabilities plus 
long-term debt, divided by beginning-of-year assets. ASSETS is the natural log of total assets. 
PUBLIC_PROP_S is the sum of all public firm sales (per Compustat) in each four-digit NAICS industry, 
divided by total firm sales (per Census) in the same four-digit NAICS industry. PUBLIC_PROP_F is the 
number of public firms (Compustat GVKEY) in each four-digit NAICS industry, divided by the total 
number of firms (per Census) in the same four-digit NAICS industry. TAX_CHANGE is an indicator 
variable set to 1 (-1) for firm-years in which the firm is headquartered in states that decreased (increased) 
corporate income taxes, and zero otherwise. TAX_INCREASE (TAX_DECREASE) is an indicator variable 
set to 1 for firm-years where the firm is headquartered in states that decreased (increased) corporate 
income taxes, and zero otherwise. Regressions include industry and year indicator variables, which have 
not been tabulated. The t-statistics are adjusted to control for residual correlation in firms’ investment. 
*,**,*** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, using a one-tailed t-test when a 
prediction is indicated and two-tailed t-test otherwise. 
 
Panel A: Measuring investment opportunities using sales growth 
   
 
 
Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t -Statistic
Intercept 0.0179 *** 18.34 0.0185 *** 18.99
SALES_GR + 0.0161 *** 9.69 0.0173 *** 10.36
PUBLIC_PROP 0.0048 *** 4.54 0.0566 *** 2.90
SALES_GR × PUBLIC_PROP + 0.0127 *** 3.88 0.0544 ** 1.89
HI -0.0002 ** -2.37 -0.0001 -1.46
HI × SALES_GR -0.0002 -0.48 0.0002 0.76
ROA 0.0645 *** 35.32 0.0647 *** 35.43
CASH 0.0177 * 1.91 0.0180 1.63
LEVERAGE -0.0413 *** -26.43 -0.0415 *** -26.54
ASSETS -0.0036 *** -15.83 -0.0035 *** -15.60
R -squared
Industry indicators
Year indicators
Standard errors clustered by firm
No. of observations
Dependent variable = INV
PUBLIC_PROP_S PUBLIC_PROP_F
7.60% 7.62%
70,235 70,235
Measure of public firm presence (PUBLIC_PROP)Predicted 
Sign
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Measuring investment opportunities using Tobin’s Q 
   
 
Panel C: Measuring investment opportunities using industry Q 
   
 
Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t -Statistic
Intercept 0.0179 *** 14.27 0.0194 *** 15.63
TOBIN'S_Q + 0.0009 * 1.32 0.0006 * 1.56
PUBLIC_PROP 0.0185 *** 7.73 0.1072 1.23
TOBIN'S_Q × PUBLIC_PROP + 0.0080 *** 5.98 0.0221 *** 2.28
HI -0.0010 *** -5.10 -0.0006 *** -3.08
HI × TOBIN'S_Q 0.0006 * 1.68 0.0002 ** 2.14
ROA 0.0684 *** 37.52 0.0681 *** 37.34
CASH 0.0178 ** 2.22 0.0180 1.61
LEVERAGE -0.0409 *** -26.07 -0.0412 *** -26.28
ASSETS -0.0029 *** -12.86 -0.0029 *** -12.90
R -squared
Industry indicators
Year indicators
Standard errors clustered by firm
No. of observations
Dependent variable = INV
Measure of public firm presence (PUBLIC_PROP)Predicted 
Sign
Yes Yes
70,235 70,235
Yes Yes
PUBLIC_PROP_S PUBLIC_PROP_F
4.67% 4.61%
Yes Yes
 
Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t -Statistic
Intercept 0.0186 *** 17.90 0.0198 *** 19.23
INDUSTRY_Q + 0.0091 * 1.52 0.0006 * 1.35
PUBLIC_PROP 0.0006 0.25 0.1500 ** 2.54
INDUSTRY_Q × PUBLIC_PROP + 0.0038 *** 2.43 0.0436 ** 1.64
HI -0.0003 -1.20 -0.0006 *** -3.20
HI × INDUSTRY_Q 0.0000 0.06 0.0003 *** 2.68
ROA 0.0682 *** 37.39 0.0681 *** 37.33
CASH 0.0179 *** 8.46 0.0181 *** 8.55
LEVERAGE -0.0411 *** -26.25 -0.0413 *** -26.32
ASSETS -0.0029 *** -12.74 -0.0029 *** -12.66
R -squared
Industry indicators
Year indicators
Standard errors clustered by firm
No. of observations 70,235 70,235
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
4.61% 4.58%
Dependent variable = INV
Predicted 
Sign
Measure of public firm presence (PUBLIC_PROP)
PUBLIC_PROP_S PUBLIC_PROP_F
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
Panel D: Measuring investment opportunities using changes in state corporate income tax rates 
 
 
Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t -Statistic
Intercept 0.0262 *** 22.95 0.0264 *** 22.90 0.0302 *** 28.97
TAX_CHANGE + 0.0120 ** 1.91 --- --- 0.0020 1.17
TAX_DECREASE + --- --- 0.0056 * 1.60 --- ---
TAX_INCREASE - --- --- -0.0084 ** -2.07 --- ---
PUBLIC_PROP_S 0.0065 *** 4.10 0.0062 *** 3.87 0.0033 ** 2.33
PUBLIC_PROP_S × TAX_CHANGE + 0.0214 ** 1.77 --- 0.0102 1.03
PUBLIC_PROP_S × TAX_DECREASE + --- --- 0.0054 ** 1.69 --- ---
PUBLIC_PROP_S × TAX_INCREASE - --- --- -0.0064 ** -1.84 --- ---
SALES_GR + 0.0145 *** 5.58 0.0146 *** 5.58 + 0.0186 *** 8.63
SALES_GR × PUBLIC_PROP + 0.0116 *** 2.35 0.0116 *** 2.35 + 0.0126 *** 2.86
HI -0.0043 * -1.74 -0.0003 * -1.74 -0.0001 -0.41
HI × SALES_GR 0.0002 0.41 0.0002 0.40 -0.0004 -0.90
ROA 0.0740 *** 20.64 0.0740 *** 20.63 0.0645 *** 28.96
CASH 0.0082 ** 2.52 0.0081 ** 2.51 0.0275 *** 9.99
LEVERAGE -0.0399 *** -16.14 -0.0399 *** -16.15 -0.0382 *** -19.20
ASSETS -0.0032 *** -9.28 -0.0032 *** -9.27 -0.0044 *** -14.95
R -squared
Industry indicators
Year indicators
Standard errors clustered by firm
No. of observations
Dependent variable = INV
Predicted 
sign
4.39% 5.13%
Firms not  incorporated 
under IRS Subchapter C
Predicted 
signFirms incorporated under IRS Subchapter C
4.40%
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
28,037 42,198
Yes Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
28,037
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Table 3 
Investment regressions conditional on public firm presence and information quality 
 
  This table reports the results from regressions of changes in gross fixed assets on past sales growth, the proportion of public firms in an industry, industry 
information quality (INFO_QTY), interaction terms between these variables, and control variables. INFO_QTY is measured using the following variables. 
Earnings informativeness is measured as the coefficient for changes in earnings (i.e., β1) in the following regression estimated for each industry-year: RETi,t = 
α + β1ΔEARNINGSi,t + εt, where RETi,t is the stock returns for firm i in year t, ΔEARNINGS is the change in earnings before extraordinary items for firm i in 
year t. Management guidance is measured as the total number of firms providing at least one earnings guidance in each industry-year. Analyst coverage is 
measured as the average number of Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) analyst forecast estimates for each firm in a fiscal year and four-digit 
NAICS industry. All other variables are as defined in Tables 1 and 2. Regressions include industry and year indicator variables, which have not been 
tabulated. The t-statistics are adjusted to control for residual correlation in firms’ investment. *,**,*** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively, using a one-tailed t-test when a prediction is indicated and a two-tailed t-test otherwise. 
 
 
 
Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t -Statistic
SALES_GR + 0.0084 *** 3.60 0.0163 *** 9.31 0.0220 *** 10.03
PUBLIC_PROP_S 0.0054 *** 3.97 0.0045 *** 3.52 -0.0025 -0.88
SALES_GR × PUBLIC_PROP_S + 0.0117 *** 2.81 0.0142 *** 3.62 0.0157 ** 1.73
INFO_QTY -0.0002 -0.80 -0.0008 *** -6.89 -0.0018 *** -15.91
SALES_GR × INFO_QTY 0.0007 1.02 -0.0008 ** -2.14 -0.0150 *** -4.57
PUBLIC_PROP_S × INFO_QTY 0.0018  *** 2.66 0.0005 *** 4.68 0.0019 *** 4.98
SALES_GR × PUBLIC_PROP_S × INFO_QTY + 0.0020 ** 2.17 0.0025 ** 2.26 0.0036 *** 2.98
HI 0.0001 0.52 0.0003 ** 2.22 0.0000 0.38
HI × SALES_GR 0.0006 * 1.70 0.0002 0.62 0.0000 0.06
ROA 0.0619 *** 28.14 0.0646 *** 35.37 0.0625 *** 34.20
CASH 0.0224 *** 3.48 0.0170 *** 8.05 0.0160 1.41
LEVERAGE -0.0373 *** -20.08 -0.0418 *** -26.73 -0.0411 *** -26.43
ASSETS -0.0038 *** -13.95 -0.0037 *** -16.27 -0.0035 *** -15.26
R -squared
Year & industry indicators
Standard errors clustered by firm
No. of observations
Dependent variable = INV
Public information quality (INFO_QTY)
Analyst coverage
7.92%
Yes
5.21% 5.41%
Predicted 
sign Earnings informativness Management guidance
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
47,940 70,235 70,235
Yes
 53 
 
Table 4 
Investment regressions conditional on public firm presence and degree of investment irreversibility  
 
  This table reports the results from regressions of changes in gross fixed assets on past sales growth, the proportion of public firms in an industry, industry 
investment irreversibility, interaction terms between these variables, and control variables. IND_IRR is measured using three proxies: 1) Return 
comovement, 2) Asset illiquidity, and 3) New/used capital goods. Return comovement is computed by regressing the monthly returns for each public firm 
on an equally weighted market return index and an equally weighted industry return index. The partial correlation coefficient for the industry return index 
is averaged across all firms in each industry to obtain our proxy. Asset illiquidity is computed by aggregating all corporate transactions in a four-digit 
NAICS industry each year from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database, then scaling it by the aggregate book value of equity of all firms in that 
industry. We multiply this measure by -1 to obtain asset illiquidity. New/used capital goods is computed as the ratio of total expenditures on new capital 
goods to total expenditures on both new and used capital goods at the three-digit NAICS industry level. These data are obtained from the Annual Capital 
Expenditures Survey (ACES), published by the Census Bureau in 2003. All other variables are as defined in Tables 1 and 2. Regressions include industry 
and year indicators. The t-statistics are adjusted to control for residual correlation in firms’ investment. *,**,*** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively, using a one-tailed t-test when a prediction is indicated and a two-tailed t-test otherwise. 
 
 
Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
SALES_GR + 0.0157 ** 2.60 0.0156 *** 8.43 0.0196 *** 5.36
PUBLIC_PROP_S 0.0345 *** 6.23 0.0077 *** 6.53 0.0089 *** 4.17
SALES_GR × PUBLIC_PROP_S + 0.0411 *** 2.43 0.0138 *** 3.77 0.0239 ** 1.87
IND_IRR -0.0081 -1.30 0.0171 *** 7.80 0.0002 *** 2.93
SALES_GR × IND_IRR 0.0005 0.07 0.0051 0.70 0.0008 1.26
PUBLIC_PROP_S × IND_IRR -0.0333 *** -5.41 0.0213 ** 2.43 0.0010 *** 5.17
SALES_GR × PUBLIC_PROP_S × IND_IRR + 0.0335 ** 1.77 0.0154 *** 2.75 0.0213 ** 1.77
HI -0.0002 -1.50 -0.0002 ** -2.23 -0.0003 ** -2.52
HI × SALES_GR 0.0000 0.14 -0.0002 -0.49 0.0010 ** 2.15
ROA 0.0643 *** 34.88 0.0640 *** 35.05 0.0547 *** 20.94
CASH 0.0176 *** 8.28 0.0180 *** 8.53 0.0206 *** 6.33
LEVERAGE -0.0411 *** -26.13 -0.0407 *** -26.08 -0.0278 *** -12.98
ASSETS -0.0036 *** -15.59 -0.0035 *** -15.69 -0.0024 *** -7.43
R -squared
Year & industry indicators
Standard errors clustered by firm
No. of observations
Dependent variable = INV
New/used capital goods
3.82%
Yes
Yes
5.40%
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
5.35%
Return comovement Asset illiquidity
Predicted 
sign
59,366
Degree of industry irreversibility (IND_IRR)
70,23570,235
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Table 5 
Instrumental variables regressions with the residual audit fees and distance from investors as instruments for public firm presence 
 
  This table reports the results from two-stage-least-squares regressions of changes in gross fixed assets on past sales growth, the proportion of public firms in an 
industry, an interaction between the two, and control variables. Panel A (B) presents the results from estimating the first-stage (second-stage) regressions. We 
instrument for PUBLIC_PROP_S using 1) an estimate of the residual audit fees, which are unexplained by firm characteristics, and 2) the proportion of firms in the 
industry headquartered near potential investors. All variables are as defined in Tables 1 and 2. Regressions include industry and year indicator variables. The t-
statistics are adjusted to control for residual correlation in firms’ investment. *,**,*** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, using a one-
tailed t-test when a prediction is indicated and a two-tailed t-test otherwise. 
 
Panel A: First-stage regressions 
 
Dependent variable   = 
Coef. t -Stat Coef. t -Stat Coef. t -Stat Coef. t -Stat Coef. t -Stat Coef. t -Stat
SALES_GR 0.027 *** 2.95 0.133 *** 16.55 0.042 *** 7.39 0.072 *** 14.69 0.028 *** 2.97 0.136 *** 16.69
RAUDIT_FEES  -0.095 *** -20.45 0.001 1.39 --- --- --- ---  -0.096 *** -20.54 0.001 1.36
DISTANCE --- --- --- --- 0.019 *** 4.80 0.001 1.12 0.021 *** 5.30 0.001 1.02
SALES_GR × RAUDIT_FEES -0.015 -1.29  -0.116 *** -7.18 --- --- --- --- -0.015 -1.28  -0.116 *** -7.21
SALES_GR × DISTANCE --- --- --- --- 0.005 1.49 0.021 *** 4.58 0.006 0.54 0.022 ** 2.43
HI 0.035 *** 19.45 0.001 * 1.75 0.036 *** 37.49 0.001 * 1.73 0.035 *** 39.40 0.001 * 1.77
HI × SALES_GR 0.007 *** 6.51 0.038 *** 3.59 0.008 *** 7.26 0.004 *** 4.83 0.007 *** 6.52 0.038 *** 3.50
ROA 0.047 *** 7.65 0.021 *** 8.17 0.034 *** 5.71 0.020 *** 7.87 0.048 *** 7.69 0.021 *** 8.16
CASH 0.024 *** 2.89 0.003 0.99 0.025 *** 3.06 0.002 0.79 0.024 *** 2.84 0.003 0.97
LEVERAGE -0.007 -1.35  -0.010 *** -4.52 -0.008 -0.88  -0.010 *** -5.02 -0.007 -1.17  -0.010 *** -4.60
ASSETS 0.014 *** 16.33 0.003 *** 10.58 0.015 *** 17.56 0.003 *** 11.03 0.014 *** 16.00 0.003 *** 10.45
R -squared
Year & industry indicators
No. of observations 70,235
PUBLIC_PROP_S SALES_GR × 
PUBLIC_PROP_S
PUBLIC_PROP_S
Yes
Instrument = Distance from investors
17.04% 49.63%
67,998 67,998
Yes Yes
Instrument = Residual audit fees
17.37% 48.33%
Model (1)
67,998 67,998
PUBLIC_PROP_S SALES_GR × 
PUBLIC_PROP_S
Overidentified model
17.41% 48.35%
Yes Yes
Model (3)
70,235
SALES_GR × 
PUBLIC_PROP_S
Yes
Model (2)
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Second-stage regressions 
 
Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t -Statistic
SALES_GR + 0.0128 *** 3.43 0.0154 *** 7.19 0.0148 *** 4.06
PUBLIC_PROP_S 0.0377 *** 2.24 0.0460 *** 5.76 0.0518 *** 3.17
SALES_GR × PUBLIC_PROP_S + 0.0385 ** 1.93 0.0086 ** 1.84 0.0321 ** 1.80
HI -0.0013 ** -2.16 -0.0117 *** -5.67 -0.0018 *** -3.11
HI × SALES_GR -0.0008 -0.49 0.0004 0.49 -0.0007 -0.45
ROA 0.0678 *** 30.55 0.0681 *** 11.20 0.0690 *** 30.73
CASH 0.0222 *** 9.23 0.0219 *** 9.95 0.0226 *** 9.17
LEVERAGE -0.0392 *** -20.86 -0.0385 *** -15.56 -0.0396 *** -20.69
ASSETS -0.0035 *** -9.95 -0.0030 *** -13.06 -0.0030 *** -8.89
R -squared
First-stage partial F -statistic
p -value of partial F -statistic 
Overidentifying test (Sargan J -statistic)
Overidentifying test (p -value)
Year & industry indicators
No. of observations 67,998 70,235
0.0000 0.0000
Yes Yes
Predicted 
sign Residual audit fees Distance from investors
5.97% 7.78%
26.70 20.96
Overidentified model
6.12%
29.93
0.0000
Yes
67,998
Dependent variable = INV
Instrument used
---- ---- 3.12
---- ---- 0.21
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
 56 
 
Table 6 
The U.K. setting: Investment regressions conditional on public firm presence 
 
  This table reports the results from regressions of changes in gross fixed assets on past sales growth, the proportion of 
public firms in an industry, an interaction between the two, and control variables. INV equals the change in gross fixed 
assets from year t-1 to year t, divided by beginning-of-year total assets. SALES_GR is the percentage change in sales from 
year t-1 to year t. HI is the Herfindahl index for competition, measured as the square of firm sales scaled by the sum of all 
firms (both private and public) in the same four-digit NAICS industry. ROA is net income, divided by beginning-of-year 
total assets. CASH is cash and cash equivalents, divided by beginning-of-year assets. LEVERAGE is long-term debt, divided 
by beginning-of-year assets. ASSETS is the natural log of total assets at the beginning of the year. PUBLIC_PROP_S is the 
sum of all public firm sales in each four-digit NAICS industry, divided by total firm sales (per Bureau Van Dijk) in the 
same four-digit NAICS industry. *,**,*** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, using a one-tailed 
t-test when a prediction is indicated and a two-tailed t-test otherwise. 
 
Predicted 
sign Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t -Statistic
Intercept 0.0206 *** 69.40 0.0187 *** 40.12 0.0095 ** 2.00
SALES_GR + 0.0089 *** 19.15 0.0090 *** 11.19 0.0071 *** 6.56
PUBLIC_PROP 0.0094 *** 4.91 0.0305 *** 3.73
SALES_GR × PUBLIC_PROP_S -0.0007 -0.21 -0.0003 -0.04
HI 0.0178 1.56
HI × SALES_GR 0.0000 *** 3.06
ROA 0.0724 *** 22.39
CASH 0.0144 *** 6.85
LEVERAGE 0.0280 *** 17.25
ASSETS -0.0022 *** -15.59
R -squared
Industry indicators
Year indicators
Standard errors clustered by firm
No. of observations
Dependent variable = INV
286,055 286,055
3.07%
Yes
Yes
Yes
182,184
No No
No No
No No
0.26% 0.27%
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Table 7 
Investment regressions using firm fixed-effects and changes specifications 
 
  Panel A reports the results from our main investment regression model using firm fixed-effects. Panel B reports the results 
from regressions of the change in firms’ investment on the change in investment opportunities, change in the proportion of 
public firms in an industry, an interaction between the two, and the change in control variables. All variables are defined in 
Tables 1 and 2. In Panel B, we compute the change in our variables from 2004 to 2007, and each observation represents a 
unique firm. The t-statistics are adjusted to control for heteroskedasticity. *,**,***  Indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively, using a one-tailed t-test when a prediction is indicated and a two-tailed t-test otherwise. 
 
Panel A: Firm fixed-effects specification 
 
 
Panel B: ‘Changes’ specification 
 
Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t -Statistic
INV_OPP + 0.0144 *** 4.26 0.0061 * 1.46 0.0087 * 1.38
PUBLIC_PROP_S -0.0076 -0.85 0.0046 1.07 -0.0008 -0.34
INV_OPP × PUBLIC_PROP_S + 0.0092 ** 1.72 0.0012 ** 2.17 0.0031 ** 1.96
HI -0.0001 -0.15 -0.0002 -1.48 -0.0006 *** -2.78
HI × INV_OPP 0.0000 0.03 0.0000 0.59 0.0004 ** 2.30
ROA 0.0620 *** 15.00 0.0701 *** 37.86 0.0696 *** 37.53
CASH 0.0238 1.17 0.0206 *** 9.59 0.0210 *** 9.77
LEVERAGE -0.0320 *** -6.78 -0.0378 *** -23.84 -0.0382 *** -24.09
ASSETS -0.0039 *** -6.02 -0.0033 *** -14.64 -0.0032 *** -14.12
R -squared
Firm indicators
Year indicators
No. of observations
Dependent variable = INV
9.65% 8.08% 8.14%
Predicted 
sign
Measure of investment opportunities (INV_OPP)
Sales growth Tobin's Q Industry Q
Yes Yes Yes
70,235 70,235 70,235
Yes Yes Yes
 
Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t -Statistic
Δ INV_OPP + 0.1413 ** 1.68 0.0784 ** 1.85 0.0455 * 1.55
Δ PUBLIC_PROP 0.0034 0.05 0.0100 0.14 -0.0288 -0.39
Δ INV_OPP × Δ PUBLIC_PROP + 0.7484 ** 2.03 0.0783 ** 2.17 0.0671 * 1.63
Δ HI -0.0017 -0.20 -0.0035 -0.37 -0.0017 -0.18
Δ HI × Δ INV_OPP -0.0231 -1.10 -0.0028 -0.13 -0.0031 -0.14
Δ ROA 0.2797 ** 2.31 0.2822 ** 2.27 0.2828 ** 2.28
Δ CASH 0.3943 * 1.69 0.4000 * 1.69 0.3980 * 1.68
Δ LEVERAGE 0.2787 * 1.80 0.2994 * 1.92 0.2928 * 1.88
Δ ASSETS 0.4477 1.58 0.4134 1.49 0.4177 1.52
R -squared
Industry indicators
No. of observations
Dependent variable = Change in investment (Δ INV)
Predicted 
sign
Measure of investment opportunities (INV_OPP)
Sales growth Tobin's Q Industry Q
3,647 3,647 3,647
10.74% 10.16% 10.04%
Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8 
Public firm presence and financing constraints 
 
This table reports the results from a regression of the change in firms’ long-term debt on changes in the proportion 
of public firms in an industry and control variables. Long-term debt is the firm’s long-term debt, scaled by assets. 
PUBLIC_PROP_S is the sum of all public firm sales (per Compustat) in each four-digit NAICS industry, divided 
by total firm sales (per Census) in the same four-digit NAICS industry. PUBLIC_PROP_F is the number of public 
firms (Compustat GVKEY) in each four-digit NAICS industry, divided by the total number of firms (per Census) 
in the same four-digit NAICS industry. INTEREST_COVERAGE is earnings before interest, taxes, and 
depreciation, divided by interest expense. CURRENT_RATIO is the total current assets, divided by total current 
liabilities. PPE is the net property, plant, and equipment, divided by total assets. LEVERAGE is total liabilities 
divided by total assets. COST_OF_DEBT is the interest expense in year t+1, divided by the average debt in year 
t+1 and year t, where debt is the calculated as: short-term debt plus current portion of long-term debt plus total 
long-term liabilities. LN_ASSETS is the natural log of total assets plus one. SALES_GROWTH is the percentage 
change in sales in year t. AUDIT is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm received a financial statement 
audit, zero otherwise. All variables are measured as the change from 2004 to 2007. Regressions include industry 
indicator variables. The t-statistics are adjusted to control for heteroskedasticity. *,**,*** Indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, using a one-tailed t-test when a prediction is indicated and a two-tailed t-test 
otherwise. 
 
 
 
Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t -Statistic
Intercept -0.0173 *** -2.76 -0.0171 *** -2.72
Δ PUBLIC_PROP + 0.0151 0.44 0.1484 0.12
Δ INTEREST_COVERAGE -0.0029 *** -8.03 -0.0029 *** -8.04
Δ CURRENT_RATIO -0.0228 *** -7.30 -0.0228 *** -7.30
Δ PPE 0.0500 ** 1.97 0.0502 ** 1.97
Δ COST_OF_DEBT -0.0550 -0.77 -0.0548 -0.77
Δ LN_ASSETS 0.0746 *** 3.01 0.0746 *** 3.01
Δ SALES_GR -0.0250 * -1.91 -0.0249 * -1.91
Δ AUDIT 0.0029 0.13 0.0030 0.13
R -squared
Industry indicators
Robust standard errors
No. of observations
Yes
Yes Yes
3,647 3,647
Dependent variable = Change in long-term debt
Predicted 
sign
Measure of public firm presence (PUBLIC_PROP)
PUBLIC_PROP_S PUBLIC_PROP_F
22.99% 22.98%
Yes
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Table 9 
Analysis of public firms: Investment regressions conditional on public firm presence 
 
  This table reports the results from regressions of investment on investment opportunities, the proportion of public firms in an industry, an interaction between 
the two, and control variables for the sample of public firms in Compustat. INV equals the change in gross fixed assets from year t-1 to t, divided by beginning-
of-year total assets. SALES_GR is the percentage change in sales from year t-1 to year t. TOBIN’S_Q is the market value of equity plus the book value of debt, 
scaled by the book value of assets. INDUSTRY_Q is the sum of aggregate market value of equity and aggregate book value of debt in an industry, divided by 
aggregate total assets in that industry. HI equals the Herfindahl index for competition, measured as the square of firm sales scaled by the sum of all firms (both 
private and public) in the same four-digit NAICS industry. ROA equals net income, divided by beginning-of-year total assets. CASH is cash and cash equivalents, 
divided by beginning-of-year assets. LEVERAGE is debt in current liabilities plus long-term debt, divided by beginning-of-year assets. ASSETS is the natural log 
of total assets. PUBLIC_PROP_S is the sum of all public firm sales (per Compustat) in each four-digit NAICS industry, divided by total firm sales (per Census) 
in the same four-digit NAICS industry. PUBLIC_PROP_F is the number of public firms (Compustat GVKEY) in each four-digit NAICS industry, divided by the 
total number of firms (per Census) in the same four-digit NAICS industry. TAX_CHANGE is an indicator variable set to 1 (-1) for firm-years headquartered in 
states that decreased (increased) corporate income taxes, and zero otherwise. Regressions include industry and year indicator variables. The t-statistics are 
adjusted to control for residual correlation in firms’ investment. *,**,*** Indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively, using a one-tailed t-test 
when a prediction is indicated and a two-tailed t-test otherwise. 
 
 
 
Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t -Statistic Coefficient t -Statistic
INV_OPP + 0.0902 *** 24.27 0.0133 *** 17.98 0.0048 *** 4.35 0.0073 ** 2.10
PUBLIC_PROP_S 0.0028 ** 2.31 0.0127 *** 7.44 0.0211 *** 7.62 0.0067 *** 5.37
INV_OPP × PUBLIC_PROP_S + 0.0356 *** 7.91 0.0056 *** 6.32 0.0112 *** 6.84 0.0069 *** 2.58
HI 0.0009 *** 16.97 0.0010 *** 13.81 0.0010 *** 10.79 0.0004 *** 9.44
HI × INV_OPP 0.0015 *** 9.04 0.0003 *** 8.88 0.0004 *** 5.82 0.0044 *** 48.91
ROA 0.0798 *** 36.39 0.1049 *** 46.40 0.1007 *** 43.32 0.0844 *** 38.04
CASH 0.012 *** 6.10 0.0104 *** 4.81 0.0363 *** 17.11 0.0220 *** 11.09
LEVERAGE -0.0675 *** -36.01 -0.0638 *** -31.76 -0.0870 *** -43.34 -0.0737 *** -38.47
ASSETS -0.0019 *** -10.06 -0.0008 *** -4.04 -0.0032 *** -15.19 -0.0022 *** -11.15
R -squared
Year & industry indicators
Standard errors clustered by firm
No. of observations
Yes Yes
Predicted 
sign Sales growth Tobin's Q
20.91% 14.86%
56,950
Measure of investment ppportunities (INV_OPP)
Dependent variable = INV
Tax changes
18.84%
Yes
Yes
56,950 56,950
Industry Q
10.40%
Yes
Yes
56,950
Yes Yes
